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Presentence Confinement and the
Constitution: The Burial
of Dead Time
By F. THOMAS SCHORNHORST*
By early 1970 at least 160,863 persons were confined in jails
throughout the United States; over one-half of them had not been
convicted of any crime. Thirty-five percent of those not yet con-
victed remained in custody because they were unable to post bail.'
Thus, because of their financial situation these innocent men and women
remained in prison. They were treated no differently than prisoners
who were serving sentences-they ate the same food, lived in the
same crowded cells, endured the same dehumanizing experiences,
and were subject to the same restrictions with regard to visitors, mail,
and reading material. A large percentage of these unconvicted per-
sons had a further cause for anger and frustration-they were doing
"dead time"; that is, in the event of conviction the time they will
have spent in jail will not count as a part of their sentences unless
they have been jailed in one of the two dozen or so United States ju-
risdictions2 that provide credit for presentence custody by statute.
The purpose of this article is to explore and evaluate the methods
and rationale by which the various jurisdictions in the United States
grant or withhold credit for time served prior to sentence. The ma-
jor thesis is that all prisoners serving sentences in any jail or prison in
the United States are constitutionally entitled to full credit3 for each
* A.B., 1956, University of Iowa; J.D., 1963, George Washington University.
Professor of Law, Indiana University. Member, District of Columbia Bar.
1. NATIONAL CRIMNAL JUSTICE INFORMATION AND STATISTICS SERVICE, STATIS-
TICTS CENTER REPORT S.C.-1 (National Jail Census) (1970).
2. See generally AMERICAN BAR AssocrATIoN PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND
PROCEDURES 186-96 (Tent Draft 1967) [hereinafter cited as ABA SENTENCING
STANDARDS].
3. The term "full credit" is employed for the purpose of emphasizing that pre-
day of presentence confinement' served in connection with the crime
for which they have been sentenced.
Current Approaches Regarding Credit
for Presentence Confinement
Nonstatutory
Courts generally have refused to recognize any common law or
constitutional basis for including presentence confinement as a part
of any sentence.5  The few state courts that have considered the ques-
tion justify their refusal to award credit either by citing statutes which
provide that a sentence does not commence until the date of arrival
at the place of confinement, 6 or until the date of imposition of the
sentence, 7 or in the absence of such statutes, simply declare them-
selves powerless to award credit for presentence time. Quite often the
court making such a disposition observes that presentence jail time is
taken into account in determining the length of sentence which is im-
posed. 8
sentence time should be treated in all respects as if it had been served pursuant to
sentence. In other words, the presentence time upon which credit is due must be
counted in determining eligibility for parole and for computing statutory good time
credits.
4. The terms "confinement" and "custody" are used to emphasize the point that
credit for presentence time may be due for periods during which the accused has
been confined in mental and juvenile institutions as well as jails.
5. E.g., Harper v. State, 249 Ark. 1013, 462 S.W.2d 847, 849 (1971); People v.
Jones, - Colo. -, 489 P.2d 596, 599-600 (1971); Jenkins v. Warden, 4 Md. App.
629, 632, 244 A.2d 468, 469 (1968); Ibsen v. Warden, - Nev. -, 471 P.2d 229, 231
(1970); State v. Virgil, 276 N.C. 217, 226, 172 S.E.2d 28, 34 (1970); State v. Sanders,
251 S.C. 431, 445, 163 S.E.2d 220, 228 (1968); State v. Wills, 68 Wash. 2d 145,
147, 416 P.2d 124, 126-27 (1966). But see Brown v. State, - Miss. -, 217 So. 2d
521, 523 (1969) (time served due to inability to make bond is "deductible" from a
subsequent sentence).
6. See, e.g., Ex parte Cofield, 42 Ala. App. 344, 345, 164 So. 2d 716, 717
(1964); State v. Kennedy, 106 Ariz. 190, 193, 472 P.2d 59, 62 (1970); Lyons v.
State, 5 Ariz. App. 364, 427 P.2d 345, 346 (1967). See also Byers v. United States,
175 F.2d 654, 656 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 976 (1949).
7. See, e.g., Ibsen v. Warden, - Nev. -, 471 P.2d 229 (1970). Also, the
interval between conviction and sentence is, in the absence of statute, generally treated
as dead time. State v. Winston, - R.I. -, 252 A.2d 354, 358 (1969); cf. Doelle v.
United States, 301 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1962).
8. See, e.g., State v. Kennedy, 106 Ariz. 190, 193, 472 P.2d 59, 62 (1970).
Also, it is evident that presentence confinement is ignored when the defendant is
sentenced to a maximum term. E.g., Jenkins v. Warden, 4 Md. App. 629, 632,
244 A.2d 468, 469 (1968) (Defendant on retrial for first degree murder was con-
victed of second degree murder and given the then statutory maximum of 18 years in
prison. No credit was given for the 1 year and 61 days spent in confinement prior
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Thus, so far, state courts have ignored arguments that failure to
give credit for presentence confinement is a deprivation of either due
process, or equal protection, or is an imposition of double punishment
in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 9 Likewise, fed-
eral courts have refused to intervene in such cases on the grounds that
the granting of credit for presentence confinement is a matter of state
law. 10 Recently, however, this pattern of nonintervention has been
broken by two federal district courts which have concluded that a
state's denial of full credit for presentence jail time to a person unable
to post bail is a denial of equal protection of the law.la
State Statutory Approaches
The state statutes which allow credit for confinement prior to fi-
nal disposition may be divided into two general categories-those
which provide mandatory credit for presentence time,1" and those
to his first sentence which, incidentally, was death); Wright v. Maryland Penitentiary,
429 F.2d 1101 (4th Cir. 1970) (no credit on maximum 18 year sentence for second
degree murder for two years and six weeks of pretrial confinement); Miles v. State,
214 So. 2d 101 (Fla. App. 1968); State v. Sanders, 251 S.C. 431, 163 S.E.2d 220
(1968). Again, where the offense for which the defendant is convicted requires the
imposition of a minimum term the sentence cannot itself reflect credit for presentence
confinement. E.g., Stapf v. United States, 367 F.2d 326, 329 (D.C. Cir. 1966)
(discussed in text accompanying notes 40-49 infra).
These matters are discussed below in greater detail. See text accompanying notes
107-119 infra.
9. State v. Kennedy, 106 Ariz. 190, 193, 472 P.2d 59, 62 (1970); Jenkins v.
Warden, 4 Md. App. 629, 631, 244 A.2d 468, 470 (1968); Drew v. State, 458 S.W.2d
263, 265 (Mo. 1970); Ibsen v. Warden, - Nev. -, 471 P.2d 229, 230 (1970); State v.
Lewis, 7 N.C. App. 178, 185, 171 S.E.2d 793, 799 (1970); Bums v. Page, 446 P.2d
622, 623 (Okla. Crim. App. 1968); Bennett v. State, 450 S.W.2d 652, 657 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1970); cf. Bowen v. Recorders Court Judge, 384 Mich. 55, 59, 179 N.W.2d
377, 379 (1970).
10. E.g., Gremillion v. Henderson, 425 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1970); Arsad v.
Henry, 317 F. Supp. 162, 163 (E.D.N.C. 1970); Gross v. Sarver, 307 F. Supp.
1105, 1107 (E.D. Ark. 1970); Sanders v. South Carolina, 296 F. Supp. 563, 573
(D.S.C. 1969); Newell v. Page, 280 F. Supp. 203, 204 (N.D. Okla. 1968). But see
Wright v. Warden, 429 F.2d 1101, 1103 (4th Cir. 1970); Robinson v. Beto, 426 F.2d
797, 798 (5th Cir. 1970).
10a. Workman v. Cardwell, 11 Crim. L. Rep. 2027 (N.D. Ohio, Mar. 7, 1972);
Royster v. McGinnis, 332 F. Supp. 973 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), prob. furis. noted, 40
U.S.L.W. 3455 (U.S. Mar. 20, 1972).
11. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 119-3 (Smith-Hurd 1972); INDIANA Acrs OF
1971, Pub. L. 155. This statute was declared unconstitutional in State ex rel. Pearcy
v. Criminal Court of Marion County, - Ind. -, 274 N.E.2d 519 (1971), on the
ground that time credit provision was included in a statute having more than one sub-
ject matter in violation of article 4 section 19 of the Constitution of the State of Indi-
ana. However, a more comprehensive time credit statute was passed by the Indiana
legislature in 1972-Indiana Code 1971, 35-8, ch. 2.5, added by Senate Enrolled Act
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which allow a court discretion to award credit for time already served.' 2
In addition, the statutes may be viewed according to the time pe-
riod for which credit is given-either for presentence custody or for
some other time period. However, because all or some of these fea-
tures are present in varying degrees in the statutes, it is impossible to
discuss the statutes according to the particular type. For instance,
among statutes requiring credit for presentence custody there is con-
siderable variation, not to mention ambiguity, within the provisions
themselves. Some statutes require credit for the time served between
arrest and pronouncement of sentence;"3 other statutes specify that
credit is to be given for all time spent in custody prior to commence-
ment of sentence, which may be a different date than pronouncement
of sentence. 14  As to statutes which allow a court discretion to
award credit, there is also no particular pattern. As in the case of
mandatory statutes, the statutes distinguish according to the time period
for which credit is sought. Some allow credit only for presentence
time while others allow credit only on appeal. Still others are a hy-
bridization of the above categories.
Perhaps the best way to illustrate the variety contained in the
statutes is to mention a few of the variations which states have de-
veloped. As to states requiring credit, Montana provides credit for
each day prior to and after conviction;"5 Oregon specifies credit for
confinement from the date of arrest to the date of delivery at the
penal institution where the sentence is to be served;' 6 Tennessee pro-
vides credit for confinement pending arraignment and trial and for
time after conviction pending commencement of sentence.' 7 In the
Tennessee statute there is no mention of credit for confinement during
No. 22, Feb., 1972. Further examples of state statutes are IOWA CODE ANN. § 246.38
(1969); Ky. REV. STAT. § 431.155 (1971); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 279, § 33A
(Supp. 1971); MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. 769.11b (1968); MONT. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 95.2215 (1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-29-25 (Supp. 1971); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 70.30(3) (McKinney 1967); ORE. REV. STAT. § 137.370(2) (1969); PA. STAT.
ANN. § 19-898 (1964); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-19-2 (1970); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 40-3102 (Supp. 1970); VA. CODE ANN. § 53-208 (Supp. 1971).
12. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.161 (Supp. 1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4614 (Supp.
1971) (credit not to exceed 90 days); MINN. STAT. ANNi. § 609.145(2) (1964)
(credit given unless court directs otherwise); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42.03
(Supp. 1972); W. VA. CODE § 61-11-24 (1966).
13. E.g., Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Mexico, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island. See note 11 supra.
14. E.g., Kentucky, New York. See note 11 supra.
15. MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 95.2215 (1969).
16. ORE. REV. STAT. § 137.370(2) (1971).
17. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-3102 (Supp. 1960).
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trial, and credit for time spent in custody pending appeal may be
awarded at the discretion of the supreme court-provided that the
appellant files a petition to the court requesting such credit within five
days after the announcement of a lower court's decision upholding
his conviction. 'Oklahoma has a rather unique statute that has both
mandatory and discretionary features, requiring credit for jail time
served only as to inmates serving their first term "with a good conduct
record and who have no infraction of the rules and regulations of the
penal institution.""' In Florida credit for presentence jail time is dis-
cretionary, but a prisoner must be given credit for time of confinement
between sentencing and delivery to the correction department. The
statute is silent regarding credit time pending appeal.19
Some statutes allow credit for time spent in confinement after con-
viction pending appeal. Some are mandatory, 0 but others give the
sentencing court discretion to award credit for such time.2' Three states
make failure to post bail a prerequisite to credit for presentence
custody,22 and many of the statutes specify a causal relation between
the presentence confinement and the ultimate sentence upon which
credit is sought.2" Indeed, some might be construed to allow credit
only if the defendant is convicted on the original charge filed against
him or, at least, a lesser included offense.24 Other statutes do not
expressly mention a need for causal connection between the original
charge and the ultimate sentence, but such a provision would seem
reasonably to be implied. 5 Only one statute requires that good time
18. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 138 (Supp. 1972). In effect, presentence jail
time is treated as an earned yet defeasible credit much like good time. See Bums v.
Page, 446 P.2d 622 (Okla. Crim. App. 1968).
19. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.161 (Supp. 1972).
20. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2505 (Supp. 1970); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-
186.1 (Supp. 1971); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-29-24 (Supp. 1971).
21. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-3102 (Supp. 1971); TEX. CODE CuM. PRO. ANN.
art. 42.03 (Supp. 1972). But see Robinson v. Beto, 426 F.2d 797 (5th Cir. 1970)
holding that denial of credit for time pending appeal is unconstitutional because it
subjects those who appeal their convictions to the risk of additional punishment and is
therefore an unlawful impediment to the exercise of the right of appeal. "Due
process requires that a state, once it establishes avenues of appellate review, must
keep those avenues free of unreasoned distinctions that impede open and equal access
to the courts ...." Id. at 798. See text accompanying notes 149-56 infra for a
further discussion of credit for time pending appeal.
22. Iowa, Michigan, Montana. See note 11 supra.
23. Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, New Mexico, New York. See note
11 supra.
24. E.g., Michigan, New Mexico. See note 11 supra.
25. Such a construction would seem to be necessary to prevent the "banking" of
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credit be given for presentence confinement, 26 but such a provision
is implicit in the Massachusetts law which requires presentence custody
to be treated as time already served.27
Most of the existing statutes are ambiguous with respect to whether
presentence time served in a place of confinement other than a jail is
to be credited against a subsequent sentence. The majority of the
mandatory credit statutes are phrased in terms of "confinement" or
"custody. '28  These terms are broad enough to cover compulsory pre-
sentence confinement in juvenile institutions, hospitals for mental ob-
servation, or in rehabilitation centers for alcoholics, drug abusers,
and sexual psychopaths. Two of the existing statutes expressly recog-
nize credit for time in mental hospitals29 while others, on their face,
would seem to limit credit to persons held in jail prior to conviction
and sentence.30
Federal Legislation
Federal law on credit for presentence confinement is best ana-
lyzed with respect to three time periods: (1) sentences imposed prior
to October 2, 1960; (2) sentences imposed between October 2, 1960,
the effective date of the first federal law granting credit for presentence
confinement, 31 and September 20, 1966, the effective date of the
most recent amendment;3 2 and sentences imposed after September 20,
1966. Both the 1960 and 1966 measures were limited in application
to sentences imposed on or after their effective dates.33
Sentences Imposed Prior to October 2, 1960
Prior to 1960, section 3568 of title 18 of the United States Code
time against future offenses. See text accompanying note 176 infra for further dis-
cussion of this point.
26. Indiana Code 1971, 35-8, ch. 2.5, added by Senate Enrolled Act No. 22,
Feb., 1972.
27. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 279, § 33A (Supp. 1971).
28. See, e.g., Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, New Mexico, New York,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island. See note 11 supra.
29. Iowa, New Jersey. See note 11 supra.
30. Michigan, Tennessee. See note 11 supra. In addition to the state and fed-
eral statutes regarding credit for time served prfor to sentence two model statutes have
been proposed. See ABA SENTENCING STXUDARDS, supra note 2, § 3.6, at 186-87;
MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.09 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
31. Act of Sept. 2, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-691, § l(a), 74 Stat. 738 (1960).
32. 18 U.S.C. § 3568 (1970).
33. Act of Sept. 2, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-691, 74 Stat. 738 (1960); Act of
June 22, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 217 (1966). However, in light of the
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provided that the sentence of a federal prisoner did not begin until
he was received at the place of confinement. There was no provision
for credit. In passing on claims of credit for presentence confinement
for sentences imposed prior to 1960, federal courts read that provi-
sion literally and held that a federal prisoner's time did not begin until
he was received at a designated place of confinement for service of his
sentence.34  The appellate courts operated under the assumption that
federal trial judges would, as a matter of course, take time already
served into account when imposing sentences on offenders.35
However, in spite of the express nonretroactive language that ac-
companied the 1960 amendment to section 3568, the Second Circuit,
in Sobell v. United States, awarded credit for the time spent in presen-
tence custody preceding Sobell's conviction and sentence in 1951. 3
An assessment of the potential impact of Sobell upon other pre-Oc-
tober 2, 1960 sentences will be deferred pending an examination of
the events occurring in the second relevant time period.
The Effect of the 1960 Amendment to Section 3568
Congress in 1960 amended section 3568 by adding the following
sentence:
[T]he Attorney General shall give any such person credit toward
service of his sentence for any days spent in custody prior to
the imposition of sentence by the sentencing court for want of
bail set for the offense under which sentence was imposed where
constitutional discussion below, the attempts to limit the retroactive application of
these statutes are probably invalid.
34. E.g., Williams v. United States, 335 F.2d 290, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Powers
v. Taylor, 327 F.2d 498 (10th Cir. 1964) (dismissing in a two paragraph per curiam
opinion a claim for time credit on a pre-1960 sentence as "patently without merit");
Byers v. United States, 175 F.2d 654, 658 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 976
(1949).
35. The legislative history of the 1960 amendment to section 3568 is reviewed
in Stapf v. United States, 367 F.2d 326, 328-29 (D.C. Cir. 1966), and in Gilbert v.
United States, 299 F. Supp. 689, 693-94) (S.D.N.Y. 1969). In Bryans v. Blackwell,
387 F.2d 764, 765 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 909 (1968), the court ob-
served that it was "universally known" that time already served was "frequently"
taken into account by the sentencing judge. Neither Bryans nor any of the congres-
sional reports include any data to support the assertion that time served was taken
into account, nor as to how credits, if any, were applied.
36. 407 F.2d 180, 182 (2d Cir. 1969). It is interesting to note that a year
earlier Sobell had been rebuffed in his attempt to obtain credit for time served while
his appeal was pending. See Sobell v. Attorney General, 400 F.2d 986, 990 (3d Cir.
1968). The problems of credit for confinement pending appeal are discussed at text
accompanying note 149-56 infra.
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the statute requires the imposition of a minimum mandatory sen-
tence.37
The stated purpose of this legislation was to allow credit for time served
in cases where federal judges were required to impose minimum
terms.3 8 In such cases the inability of a federal judge to impose less
than the statutory minimum had resulted in an unwarranted dis-
parity in the time served by those able to effect their pretrial release
on bail and who would serve at most the minimum sentence and those
who had spent their presentence time in custody for want of bail and
who would serve the minimum time without credit for time spent in
prior custody. It should be noted, however, that even with the amend-
ment there is no provision for a person who is denied bail, or who
simply chooses to remain in jail pending his trial. Nothing appears in
the legislation which would suggest a plausible reason why such a
person should not also receive credit for the time served preceding
the imposition of a minimum mandatory sentence. 39
The legality of the "minimum mandatory sentence" limitation con-
tained in the 1960 amendment was also questionable because of the dis-
parity of treatment of persons who could make bail as compared to
those who could not where a statute did not impose a mandatory
minimum. This disparity was particularly obvious in the cases of
prisoners who had received the maximum sentences allowed by the
statutes under which they were convicted. In Stapf v. United States,40
the constitutionality of the 1960 amendment was challenged by a pris-
oner who had been sentenced to serve from twenty months to five
years for interstate transportation of a stolen vehicle. 4 Stapf was un-
able to post the $1,000 bond set at the time of arrest and spent five
months in jail prior to sentencing for which no credit was given. Stapf
contended that because of the time spent in presentence custody, and
since he was subject to the maximum term of five years, his total time
could exceed that of other persons sentenced to the maximum term
under the same statute, but who were able to post bail. He argued
37. Act of Sept. 2, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-691, § 1(a), 74 Stat. 738, as amended,
18 U S.C. § 3568 (1970).
38. H.R. REP. No. 2058, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
39. See United States v. Rumbough, 393 F.2d 396, 397 (6th Cir. 1968) (no
credit available to person subject to mandatory minimum sentence where presentence
jail time was not due to want of bail); Sawyer v. United States, 376 F.2d 615, 618
(8th Cir. 1967) (no credit where defendant was held, but not convicted, on kidnapping
charge for which bail was denied).
40. 367 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
41. While the sentence was indeterminate in form, the statutory maximum un-
der the Dyer Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1970), is five years.
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that in such a situation the amendment had the effect of creating two
sets of maximum terms, one for those able to post bond and a longer
one for those unable to post bond. Such disparity, so the argument
ran, violated his right to equal protection of the law.42
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia agreed
that the district court had erred in refusing to credit Stapf's presen-
tence jail time against his maximum sentence, but not for the reasons
argued by Stapf. After surveying the legislative history of the 1960
amendment to section 3568, the court concluded:
Congress made no provision in this amendment for defendants
sentenced for offenses not carrying minimum terms of imprison-
ment . . . because it assumed that a credit for presentence cus-
tody for want of bail would continue to be provided by sentencing
courts as a matter of course.43
The court held that the district court's refusal to grant Stapf credit
for his presentence jail time created an unforeseen disparity in treat-
ment of defendants unable to make bail which was arbitrary and ir-
rational and in violation of the Fifth Amendment 44 because "it was and
is the duty of the sentencing court to provide credit for presentence
custody for want of bail to all defendants not granted credit adminis-
tratively by virtue of the provision of § 3568."' " Although the court
did not limit its holding to prisoners who had received statutory maxi-
mum sentences, cause for celebration in the cell blocks was short-lived.
The court appended a qualification to Stapf that "[w]henever it is possi-
ble, as a matter of mechanical calculation, that credit could have been
given, we will conclusively presume it was given. '' 46 With an eye on its
own and the district court dockets, the court offered as the only reason
for this limitation:
The problems and expenditures of resources which would be
caused by allowing each prisoner to attempt to demonstrate that
in his particular case credit was not given, we feel, outweigh any
possible unfairness. 47
The rationale of Stapf as to the availability of credit to prisoners
42. 367 F.2d at 327-28.
43. Id. at 328.
44. Id. at 328-29. The court noted also the anomaly of awarding prisoners time
credit on mandatory minimum sentences which were generally reserved for the more
serious types of offenses, but denying credit in cases where the crime was not seen by
the legislature as being sufficiently serious to warrant a mandatory minimum term.
45. id. at 330 (emphasis added).
46. Id.
47. Id. The validity of this "conclusive presumption" is examined later in
this article.
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serving maximum terms and who had been held in presentence custody
for want of bail has been adopted by most federal courts.4 s Only the
Fourth Circuit refused to adopt the conclusive presumption feature of
Stapf and ruled that the matter of credit should be left "to be deter-
mined according to the facts in the particular case.""
The Eighth Circuit which also construed the 1960 amendment in
Sawyer v. United States5" suggested that, in light of its legislative his-
tory, Stapf improperly construed the amendment because Congress
was concerned only with mandatory minimum terms. Sawyer also dis-
cussed the problem of what is a maximum sentence. In that case
Sawyer had been indicted on four counts under the federal bank rob-
bery statute, one of which charged the capital offense of kidnapping.51
In 1962 he pleaded guilty to two counts and received the twenty year
statutory maximum on the first count and ten years on the second count
(the statutory maximum was twenty-five years). The sentences were
48. E.g., Swift v. United States, 436 F.2d 390, 392 (8th Cir. 1970); Holt v.
United States, 422 F.2d 822, 823 (7th Cir. 1970); Davis v. Willingham, 415 F.2d 344,
345 (10th Cir. 1969); Sobell v. United States, 407 F.2d 180, 182 (2d Cir. 1969);
Lee v. United States, 400 F.2d 185, 188 (9th Cir. 1968); United States v. Jones,
393 F.2d 728, 729 (5th Cir. 1968); Bryans v. Blackwell, 387 F.2d 764, 767 (5th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 906 (1968) (no credit given because prisoner was
given less than the maximum term prescribed for his offense-i.e., two concurrent
two year sentences for interstate transportation of false securities (18 U.S.C. § 2314
(1970) for which the maximum is ten years-and the statute had no provision for a
mandatory minimum term. The court adopted and applied the conclusive pre-
sumption that the trial court, in awarding less than the maximum sentence, took into
account time previously served); United States v. Smith, 379 F.2d 628, 634 (7th Cir.
1967); Dunn v. United States, 376 F.2d 191, 193 (4th Cir. 1967). But see United
States ex rel. Sacco v. Kenton, 386 F.2d 143, 144-45 (2d Cir. 1967).
49. Padgett v. United States, 387 F.2d 649 (4th Cir. 1967). No reported
case has been found wherein any district court has made such an independent finding.
This is not to say that petitions for credit have not been made by prisoners within
the jurisdiction of the Fourth Circuit who are serving other than maximum or man-
datory minimum terms. It is reasonable to assume that if credit has been awarded in
such circumstances the government has not appealed. Also, in light of the heavy
weight that would be accorded a district court finding that credit had been given by
the sentencing judge, it is unlikely that the petitioner would press further. Still, the
absence of reported cases affords some basis for doubt as to the accuracy of the ra-
tionale supporting the conclusive presumption-i.e., the time and expense involved in
adjudicating individual claims for credit.
50. 376 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1967); see also United States ex rel. Sacco v. Kenton,
386 F.2d 143, 144-45 (2d Cir. 1967); Allen v. United States, 264 F. Supp. 420, 422-23
(M.D. Pa. 1966). However, the Second Circuit seems now to have fully adopted
Stapf. See Sobell v. United States, 407 F.2d 180, 182 (2d Cir. 1969).
51. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a), (b), (d), & (e) (1970). Count IV charged Sawyer
with kidnapping during the course of a bank robbery for which the death penalty
was a possible punishment.
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to run consecutively, 52 and the other counts, including the kidnapping
charge, were dropped. However, the ten year sentence later was
voided on the ground that consecutive sentencing for simultaneous
violations subjected the defendant to more than one punishment for
the same crime.53 This left intact the longer of the two sentences which
was the twenty year maximum imposed under count one. How-
ever, when Sawyer sought credit for 145 days of presentence jail time,
it was denied not only because his offense was not bailable due to the
kidnapping charge, but also on the ground that he was sentenced
to thirty years on two counts that could have netted him forty-five, and
there was nothing to indicate that the sentencing judge had not taken
his presentence time into account. This surprising conclusion sug-
gests strongly that the court did not take seriously its earlier holding
that the trial court was without power to aggregate penalties under
the two separate counts, and, in the circumstances, the only valid sen-
tence was twenty years which was the maximum sentence under the
applicable statute.54
Having discussed the generally accepted construction of the
1960 amendment developed in Stapf, we may return to the question of
the impact of Sobell v. United States55 on pre-1960 sentences. In
1968 Sobell sought to have his thrity year sentence corrected to re-
flect credit for approximately 71 months of presentence confine-
ment which allegedly resulted from his inability to post $100,000
bail. Sobell contended that a proper construction of section 3568,
as amended in 1960, would require that he be given credit in spite
of the congressional direction that the law be applied prospectively
only." He asserted also that denial of such credit would deprive him
of due process and equal protection of the law by imposing an addi-
52. These sentences are described in the case as concurrent, 376 F.2d at 616, but
this is obviously a misprint. At another point, 376 F.2d at 618, the court refers to a
30 year term. See also Sawyer v. United States, 312 F.2d 24, 25 (8th Cir. 1963).
53. Sawyer v. United States, 312 F.2d 24, 28 (8th Cir. 1963).
54. Id. The court could have imposed a 25 year sentence under count II and it
seems clear that the judge would have opted for the longer maximum had he been
aware of his lack of power to impose consecutive sentences under the circumstances.
Compare United States v. McCullough, 405 F.2d 722, 724 (5th Cir. 1969) (several
maximum sentences on separate counts made to run concurrently are to be treated as a
maximum sentence for purposes of credit even though the court had the power to order
consecutive sentences) with United States v. Deaton, 364 F.2d 820, 822 (6th Cir.
1966) (five concurrent maximum 10 year sentences do not come within the Stapf
interpretation of section 3568 since the defendant could have received consecutive
sentences aggregating 50 years).
55. 407 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1969), rev'g 293 F. Supp. 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
56. See Act of Sept. 2, 1960, 74 Stat. 738 (1960).
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tional term of imprisonment because he was financially unable to post
bail.5 7
Responding only to the statutory argument, the majority of the
Second Circuit found Sobell entitled to presentence time credit even
though he was sentenced before 1960, and even though the 1960
amendment contained an express prohibition against retroactive ap-
plication. The court reasoned:
The 1960 amendment makes sense only if we assume that the
courts did grant credit except where a minimum mandatory sen-
tence was required. Thus, the rationale of Stapf, which upheld
the statute against a constitutional challenge by construing it to
avoid its seeming irrationality, would require that credit be
afforded in pre- as well as post-1960 cases.58
Additional support for this holding was found in the policies reflected
in the Bail Reform Act of 196659 which included the amendment to
section 3568 awarding credit for all presentence jail time. The court
noted the nonretroactivity of the 1966 amendment"° but found that
the "policies" considered by Congress in enacting the Bail Reform
Act justified its decision."' Stapf was rejected insofar as it would
57. Sobell asserted also that the sentencing court intended to give him credit for
the presentence jail time. While the written judgment signed by Judge Kaufman
made no reference to presentence jail time, Sobell's argument that the judge meant
to give him credit was based on the following exchange at the time of sentencing:
"The Court: I, therefore sentence you to the maximum prison term provided
by statute, to wit, thirty years.
"While it may be gratuitous on my part, I at this point note my recommen-
dation against parole. This Court will stand adjourned.
"[Appellant's Counsel]: Before the Court adjourns, are the months already
served taken into consideration?
"The Court: No, they are not, but I will have to so sign the judgment.
They have to be so considered." 407 F.2d at 183. While the three circuit court
judges unanimously agreed that Sobell was entitled to credit, Judge Moore refused
to accept the majority's ruling based on a construction of section 3568, but
found that while ambiguous, Judge Kaufman's oral sentence was controlling and
any ambiguity was to be resolved in favor of the prisoner. Id. at 183-85. Judge
Friendly noted his concurrence with Judge Moore and also his concurrence with
the opinion of Judge Hays whose decision was based on an application of sec-
tion 3568. Id. at 185.
58. Id. at 182.
59. Act of June 22, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 217, codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3041, 3141-43, 3146-52, 3568 (1970).
60. 407 F.2d at 183 n.7.
61. The court did not elucidate what it found to be the relevant policy con-
siderations, but the Bail Reform Act generally was aimed at decreasing, with respect
to pretrial confinement, the disparity in treatment of those who have financial means
to post bail and those who do not. See generally PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTIcE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE
COURTS 37-39 (1967).
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prevent the retroactive application of the 1960 amendment. How-
ever, the court immediately dropped a footnote embracing Stapf's "con-
clusive presumption" that credit will be treated as having been given
whenever "as a matter of mechanical calculation" it could have been
given.
62
In summary, before the effective date of the 1966 amendment to
section 3568, a majority of federal courts held that in spite of the lan-
guage of the 1960 amendment limiting mandatory credit to persons
serving mandatory minimum terms and who prior to sentence were
held for want of bail, all prisoners who had been held in pretrial cus-
tody for want of bail were, when the statute was construed in light
of the requirements of due process and equal protection of the law,
entitled to full credit for presentence custody. However, when it ap-
peared that the presentence time added to the term imposed would
not exceed the maximum term allowed by the statute under which the
prisoner had been convicted, most federal appellate courts would pre-
sume conclusively that the sentencing judge had previously given credit.
Sobell added a further dimension holding that the due process and
equal protection rationale supporting Stapf required the award of simi-
lar credit to a person sentenced before the effective date of the 1960
amendments where (1) he received the maximum sentence, and (2)
he was held in pretrial custody because he was unable financially to
obtain his release on bail.6 3
The Bail Reform Act of 1966
In 1966 Congress amended section 3568, which in its present
form reads inpart:
The sentence of imprisonment of any person convicted of an of-
fense shall commence to run from the date on which such person
is received at the penitentiary, reformatory, or jail for service of
such sentence. The Attorney General shall give any such person
credit toward service of his sentence for any days spent in custody
in connection with the offense or acts for which sentence was
imposed ....
If any such person shall be committed to a jail or other place
of detention to await transportation to the place at which his sen-
tence is to be served, his sentence shall commence to run from
62. 407 F.2d at 183 n.8. The apparent inconsistency of this position with the
constitutional principles in Stapf and Sobell is discussed in text accompanying notes
107-15 infra.
63. In Stapf the court distinguished cases involving pre-1960 sentences and those
in which no credit was given. However, the court was careful to point out that pre-
1960 credit was not at issue. 367 F.2d at 330.
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the date on which he is received at such jail or other place of de-
tention.64
This statute reflects a liberalization of congressional attitude to-
ward credit for presentence confinement. Credit is not dependent
upon a person's inability to make bail and will not be denied if the of-
fense for which he is held is not bailable. The amendment requires
a causal connection between the "offense or acts" for which the per-
son is held in pretrial custody and any subsequent sentence but does not
require that the sentence be on the charge as originally filed or even
that for which the defendant was tried.6" Moreover, the presen-
tence time need not be served in federal custody so long as there ex-
ists a causal connection between the ultimate federal sentence and the
initial state custody.66
Another important feature of the 1966 amendment is the desig-
nation of the attorney general, who in this context would act through
the United States Bureau of Prisons, as the person responsible for the
award of presentence time credit. Assignment of administrative re-
sponsibility to the attorney general appears to effect two important
changes: (1) it enables the sentencing judge to focus on what he con-
siders an appropriate length of total confinement without regard to pre-
sentence time; and (2) removes any basis for speculation as to
whether or not the time credit was reflected in the original sentence.67
Certain problems may be encountered under present law when a
court attempts to invoke sentencing alternatives in the case of a person
who has built up presentence time credits. For example, Sullens v.
United States6" indicates that a trial court wishing to invoke the
"split sentence" provision, which permits sentencing any offender not
64. Act of June 22, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, § 4, 80 Stat. 217, codified at
18 U.S.C. § 3568 (1970).
65. H.R. REP. No. 1541, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, 20 (1966).
66. For example, a prisoner arrested by state authorities for robbery of a feder-
ally insured bank is entitled to credit for the time spent in state custody if he is later
turned over to federal authorities and is convicted for acts in connection with the
robbery. Interjurisdictional problems regarding presentence credit are considered
in the text accompanying notes 197-213 infra.
67. Trial judges have been admonished not to follow the old practice of taking
jail time into account when fixing sentence because of the possibility of giving double
credit. Putt v. United States, 392 F.2d 64, 67 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 929
(1968).
A prisoner seeking time credit pursuant to the 1966 amendment must exhaust
administrative remedies before he may seek judicial review. United States v. Morgan,
425 F.2d 1388, 1390 (5th Cir. 1970). U.S. Bureau of Prisons Directive 760051,
Oct. 30, 1969.
68. 409 F.2d 545, 548 (5th Cir. 1969).
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subject to life imprisonment or the death penalty to a term of confine-
ment of six months and a term of probation not exceeding five years,69
will have to consider the presentence custody as a part of the six
month term. Such a limitation may engender reluctance to utilize
the split sentence technique for offenders having more than a month
or two of presentence jail time. In Sullens, after being advised that
defendant's time credits exceeded the six months, the trial court resen-
tenced him to three years and invoked another statutory provision
70
to declare the defendant eligible for immediate parole. On appeal this
action was held to be an increase in punishment barred by the double
jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment.7 1
Inadequacy of Current Time Credit Statutes
Apart from the sparse federal legislative history, no clues exist
as to why the various legislatures adopted different methods of giving
prisoners credit for time spent in presentence confinement. What is
lacking most is a clearly articulated and principled rationale under-
lying the decision to grant or withhold credit. So long as the matter
of giving credit for time served prior to sentence or pending appeal is
viewed as an exercise of legislative or judicial largesse, there exists
no impetus for developing a principled approach. However, recent
constitutional developments clearly indicate the need for a re-evalua-
tion of all the existing time credit statutes.
The Constitutionality of Dead Time
Failure to award a prisoner full sentence credit, with or without
statute, for the time he spent in confinement prior to the formal com-
mencement of his sentence is subject to constitutional challenge on
three grounds: First, a person who is held in presentence custody be-
cause of his inability to post bail is denied due process and equal pro-
tection of the law if he does not receive time credit because he suffers
serious disadvantages not suffered by persons financially able to se-
cure their release. Second, a person who serves dead time suffers ad-
ditional punishment in violation of the double jeopardy clause of the
Fifth Amendment if (a) he receives a sentence with a mandatory
minimum; (b) he receives the maximum sentence; or (c) he receives
any sentence where the court or the appropriate corrections agency
69. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1970).
70. Id. § 4208(a)(2).
71. Sullens v. United States, 409 F.2d 545, 548 (5th Cir. 1969).
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does not specifically award full credit, including statutory good time
allowances, for all time spent in custody in connection with the offense
or act for which he was convicted. Third, the denial of credit for time
served prior to formal commencement of sentence penalizes a person's
insistence upon his right to a full and fair trial and is therefore a
denial of due process of law.72
Denial of Credit Is a Denial of Equal Protection
In the several federal cases discussed above,73 a denial of time
credit to persons unable to secure pretrial release on bail was held to
be a denial of due process of law under the Fifth Amendment be-
cause there was no rational basis for awarding credit only to persons
subject to minimum term sentences while withholding it from persons not
subject to minimum terms. While this analysis was based on the exist-
ence of a statute limited on its face to one class of offenders, the basic
premise supporting these decisions is that federal courts were, when-
ever possible, actually awarding credit by reducing sentences. Absent
statutory provisions and accepting the existence of a judicial prac-
tice of taking time served into account when imposing sentence, there
would still be two classes of disadvantaged persons who would serve ad-
ditional time for want of bail-those subject to mandatory minimum
terms and those sentenced to maximum terms. In other words, statutes
like the 1960 amendment to section 3568 are superfluous. This con-
clusion is supported by the approach taken in Sobell which, in spite of
the statutory direction against retroactivity, mandated presentence time
credit for a prisoner sentenced in 1951.71
Arguments seeking to uphold the constitutionality of presentence
dead time imposed upon persons financially unable to post bail are
severely shaken, if not rebutted totally, by the recent "layout" time
trilogy decided by the United States Supreme Court. In Williams
v. Illinois75 the petitioner was sentenced to the maximum one year
term for petty theft and was assessed a fine of $500 and $5.00
court costs. The judgment provided that if at the end of his one year
term he had not paid the fine and costs he was to "work off' the
72. In Short v. United States, 344 F.2d 550, 554 (D.C. Cir. 1965), Judge
Bazelon suggested a possible fourth category wherein credit would be required consti-
tutionally, i.e., where a defendant is subjected to excessive bail. Due to the dearth of
situations in which courts have been willing to find bail excessive, this theory does
not offer much promise of relief.
73. See notes 40-49 & accompanying text supra.
74. 407 F.2d at 182. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
75. 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
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amount by remaining in jail an additional day for each $5.00 owed.76
Williams challenged the state's power to hold him for 101 days be-
yond the maximum term of imprisonment provided for petty theft
solely because of his inability to pay the amount owed. The Illinois
Supreme Court found "no denial of equal protection of the law when
an indigent defendant is imprisoned to satisfy payment of the fine. '77
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed. In an opinion
written by Chief Justice Burger, the Court held that "a state may not
constitutionally imprison beyond the maximum duration fixed by a
statute a defendant who is financially unable to pay a fine,' '7 and that
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment re-
quires that the statutory ceiling placed on imprisonment for any
substantive offense be the same for all defendants irrespective of
their economic status.79
The Court conceded that there was a legitimate and substantial state
interest in providing means of collecting fines, but found that
once the State has defined the outer limits of incarceration neces-
sary to satisfy its penological interests and policies, it may not
then subject a certain class of convicted defendants to a period
of imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum solely by reason
of their indigency.80
Mr. Justice Harlan agreed with the result but restated his objec-
tion to the Court's continued use of equal protection methodology to
make what he felt to be essentially due process decisions.81 In Jus-
tice Harlan's view the case involved the due process question of whether
the legislature has impermissibly affected an individual right or has done
so in an arbitrary fashion.82 He cited with approval the test stated
in Fleming v. Nester 3 that "the Due Process Clause can be thought
76. ILL. CRIM. CODE OF 1961, § 1-7(k).
77. People v. Williams, 41 Ill. 2d 511, 517, 244 N.E.2d 197, 200 (1969), quoted
in 399 U.S. at 241.
78. 399 U.S. at 238. Chief Justice Burger relied mainly on Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956) which held it to be a denial of equal protection for states to
refuse free transcripts to indigents who otherwise would not be able to make the same
use of the state's criminal appellate process as a person who could pay for a transcript.
79. 399 U.S. at 244.
80. Id. at 241-42.
81. Id. at 259. See generally Karst, Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas
and the Return of the "Natural-Law-Due-Process" Formula, 16 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 716
(1969); Packer, The Aims of the Criminal Law Revisited: A Plea for a New
Look at "Substantive Due Process," 44 S. CAL. L REv. 490 (1971); cf. Amster-
dam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 785, 797 n.23 (1970).
82. 399 U.S. at 262.
83. 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960).
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to interpose a ban only if the statute manifests a patently arbitrary clas-
sification, utterly lacking in rational justification." Justice Harlan con-
cluded that since the state had declared its penal interest to be satis-
fied by a fine or forfeiture in combination with a jail term, "the ad-
ministrative inconvenience in a judgment collection procedure does not,
as a matter of due process, justify sending to jail, or extending the jail
term of, individuals who possess no accumulated assets." 4
While Chief Justice Burger attempted to limit Williams to the
situation where the layout time would, when added to the sentence of
imprisonment, exceed the maximum term of imprisonment permitted
by statute, a majority of his colleagues were not, in this context, con-
tent with such a narrow limitation on state power. In his concurring
opinion Justice Harlan noted that he perceived no distinction between
the circumstances in Williams and those "where the State through its
judicial agent determines that effective punishment requires less than
the maximum prison term plus a fine, or a fine alone."8 5  Moreover,
in Morris v. Schoonfield,80 the not so widely noted companion case
to Williams, three justices87 joined in a concurring opinion written
by Mr. Justice White who stressed:
[T]he same constitutional defect condemned in Williams also in-
heres in jailing an indigent for failing to make immediate pay-
ment of any fine, whether or not the fine is accompanied by ajail term and whether or not the jail term of the indigent extends
beyond the maximum term that may be imposed on a person
willing and able to pay a fine. In each case, the Constitution
prohibits the State from imposing a fine as a sentence and then
automatically converting it into a jail term solely because the de-
fendant is indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full. 88
84. 397 U.S. at 265. This method of analysis seems to have been adopted in
the federal presentence time cases, particularly in Stapf and Sobell. See notes 41-75
& accompanying text supra.
85. 397 U.S. at 265.
86. 399 U.S. 508 (1970).
87. Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall. Mr. Justice Blackmun did not
participate in either decision.
88. 399 U.S. at 509. This is not to say that these qualifications on the Williams
holding have not been ignored. Without mentioning Morris, the Indiana attorney
general, in an official opinion, advised the commissioner of the Department of Correc-
tions that layout time could be imposed on indigents who received less than maximum
sentences so long as the sentence and layout time combined do not exceed the maxi-
mum term allowed by statute. Also, the opinion suggests that "good time" allowances
are not to be taken into account in determining the maximum sentence. The Indiana
Attorney General suggests also that good time be computed on the sum of the number
of days that a prisoner would be required to serve to satisfy unpaid fines and costs
plus the time of the sentence. 1970 OP. IND. A-r'y GuN. 46. As a result of this
method of computation, an indigent prisoner sentenced to a maximum term plus a
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The most recent of the layout time cases, Tate v. Short, 9 dem-
onstrates that the equal protection rationale employed in Williams can-
not be limited to situations in which the indigent prisoner is held in ex-
cess of the maximum statutory term of imprisonment due to financial
inability to pay a fine. Expressly adopting Mr. Justice White's rea-
soning in Morris v. Schoonfield,90 the Court emphasized that "like
Williams, petitioner was subjected to imprisonment solely because of
his indigency." 91 More importantly for analysis of the impact of these
cases on the dead time issue, the Court recognized that Justice
White's conclusion in Morris followed logically from the premise stated
in Williams that
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
that the statutory ceiling placed on imprisonment for any substan-
tive offense be the same for all defendants irrespective of their
economic statns.92
To be completely consistent with Mr. Justice White's conclusion
in Morris, this premise should be modified to reflect Justice Harlan's
view that a judicial determination of "effective punishment" reflected
in a sentence less than the maximum term of imprisonment permitted
by statute also defines the outer limits of the state's penal interest
insofar as imprisonment in that particular case is concerned. 93
Applying the Fourteenth Amendment to
Presentence Confinement
There is no apparent substantive difference between a man who
serves extra time before sentence due solely to his financial inability to
post bail and a person who serves extra time after completion of his sen-
tence of imprisonment due solely to his financial inability to pay a fine.
fine would still serve a longer period of time that the person immediately able to pay
because of the longer period upon which his good time is computed.
89. 401 U.S. 395 (1971). The petitioner had, in Houston, Texas, accumulated
traffic fines aggregating $425. The ordinances violated carried no provisions for im-
prisonment, and were enforceable only by fine. Due to his indigency, the petitioner
was unable to pay his fines and was committed to the municipal prison in accordance
with the Texas layout time law. Tnx. CODE CRIM. PRo. § 45.53 (1966).
90. 399 U.S. 508, 509 (1970).
91. 401 U.S. at 398.
92. Id. at 398-99.
93. It is important to recognize, as did Justice Harlan, that such an approach
would in no way inhibit a judge's sentencing an offender to an appropriate term of
imprisonment within the statutory limits based upon his perception of the nature of the
offense and the offender, and without regard to his economic status. It is only after
such a sentence is determined that the state is prohibited from adding time merely
because of the defendant's inability to pay a fine immediately.
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In each instance the outer limit of the state's interest in keeping a man
in custody has been defined by the maximum term provided by the
relevant criminal statute and, in most cases, refined by a court's
imposition of what it concludes to be an effective or appropriate term
of imprisonment within the statutory limit.
One recent case has considered the question of whether the denial
of credit for time spent in presentence confinement violates the
equal protection clause. In Royster v. McGinnis94 the plaintiffs re-
ceived "jail time" credit for the period spent in presentence confine-
ment. They also received "good time" credit towards determining
their statutory release date-the date an inmate must be paroled by
the parole board. 5  However, a state statute96 specifically prohibited
the award of any "good time" credit for the period spent in presen-
tence confinement when determining a prisoner's minimum release date
-the earliest date on which the prisoner is eligible for parole at the
discretion of the parole board.9 7  The plaintiffs argued that the denial
of good time credit violated the equal protection clause because it
unfairly discriminated against those who could not afford to post bail
and were forced to remain in jail while awaiting trial.
A three-judge district court, one judge dissenting, held that this
denial of credit violated the equal protection clause. The court
cited Dandridge v. Williams for the proposition that "the State's ac-
tion [must only] be rationally based and free from invidious discrimi-
nation." 98  The court analyzed the purpose of awarding good time
credit and the state's arguments supporting the rule against awarding
such credit when computing a prisoner's minimum release date;99 the
court concluded that no rational purpose existed.
Although the result in Royster is correct, the reliance by the court
94. 332 F. Supp. 973 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), prob. jurisdiction noted, 40 U.S.L.W.
3455 (U.S. Mar. 20, 1972).
95. Id. at 974-75.
96. N.Y. CoRRac. LAw § 230(3) (McKinney 1968) (repealed 1970).
97. The failure to award good time credit in determining the minimum release
date delayed one plaintiff's eligibility to appear before the parole board over four
months and the other plaintiff's eligibility almost three months. 332 F. Supp. at 974.
98. Id. at 977, citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1969).
99. The state's main arguments were (1) because rehabilitation programs were
not available in county jails, there was a significant difference between the time spent
in county jail and time spent in prison; (2) good time credit is awarded for par-
ticipation in prison rehabilitation programs and no award should be made without such
participation; (3) allowing this credit would make prisoners eligible for parole before
state personnel, who were responsible for determining if they should be paroled, had
adequate opportunity to observe the prisoner's conduct. Id. at 977-79.
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on Dandridge v. Williams leaves open the possibility of a finding of
some rational basis for the distinction between presentence confine-
ment and prison time. 00 As the following discussion makes clear,
the holdings in Williams, Morris, and Tate seem to compel a finding
of a violation of the equal protection clause. The issue is not whether
there is a rational distinction between presentence confinement and
"jail time." Rather, the question is whether after Williams, Morris,
and Tate a person who can post bail can constitutionally be forced
to spend more- time in confinement than a person who can afford
to post bail. Furthermore, although the "compelling state interest" test
was not used in these three cases, this appears to be the test which was
applied. Thus, the use by the Royster court of the "rational basis"
test seems to be in error. For these reasons, the following discus-
sion is based on the Williams, Morris, and Tate cases rather than on
the holding in Royster.1°°2
The Maximum Sentence
In the case of a prisoner who spends his pretrial time in jail be-
cause of his inability to post bail and is later sentenced to the maxi-
mum term permitted by the statute he is found to have violated, the re-
sult is precisely the same as that condemned in Williams-he is sub-
ject to punishment in excess of the statutory ceiling due to his inferior
economic status. The unconstitutionality of this result is apparent
whether it be termed a denial of equal protection or, perhaps more ac-
curately, a denial of due process due to a "patently arbitrary classifi-
cation, utterly lacking in rational justification."''° While the state has
a legitimate and substantial interest in assuring the appearance at trial
of criminal defendants, and while the bail system is an imperfect yet
arguably rational means of insuring that interest, subjecting to addi-
tional disadvantages 02 those whose presence at trial is assured by pre-
100. Compare id. at 974-81 (majority opinion) with id. at 981 (dissenting
opinion).
100a. In Workman v. Caldwell, 11 Crim. L. Rep. 2027 (N.D. Ohio, Mar. 7,
1972), the court held unconstitutional on its face an Ohio statute that made discre-
tionary the award of presentence time credit: "The Equal Protection Clause requires
that all time spent in any jail prior to trial and commitment by prisoners who were
unable to make bail because of indigency must be credited to his sentence. The
Fourteenth Amendment does not conscience discretion in such matters."
101. Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960). See notes 81-84 & ac-
companying text supra.
102. See generally D. FREED & P. WALD, BAI. INr THE UNITED STATES (1964);
Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail, 113 U. PA. L. RPv. 959, 1125
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trial confinement for want of bail does nothing to further the state's
interest. The effect is to impose disparate punishment upon persons of
inadequate wealth.
One argument that is often made against a requirement that a
person be given credit for his presentence time is that the benefit of
credit flows only to the guilty. Those who are found innocent and
who have been subjected to the same pretrial confinement do not bene-
fit.10 3 Such an argument is based upon the premise that credit for time
served is a form of compensation to an injured party rather than
a manifestation of fairness towards a person who has been convicted. 104
This function of time credit was recognized by the Supreme Court in
North Carolina v. Pearce'0 5 where, with reference to credit for time
served on a reversed conviction, it was observed:
[I]f, upon a new trial, the defendant is acquitted, there is no way
the years he spent in prison can be returned to him. But if he is re-
convicted, those years can and must be returned-by subtract-
ing them from whatever new sentence is imposed.10 6
Conclusive Presumption of Credit
Since Tate's adoption of the rationale contained in the con-
curring opinion in Morris°7 it is unlikely that a state could, compat-
ibly with the Fourteenth Amendment, require an indigent unable to
pay his fine to serve layout time even though his term of imprison-
ment was originally set at less than the maximum. Conceivably a
court might give a longer sentence in lieu of a fine, but once the limi-
tation on confinement is set, even though less than the allowable max-
imum, it may not be extended merely because a person is financially
unable to pay his fine at the end of his term.
A similar rationale would apply to a person who has served time
in custody prior to trial. Assuming that the less-than-maximum sen-
tence imposed by the court reflects its view of an appropriate punish-
ment, unless the time already served is fully credited, a person may,
because of his inability to make bail, serve more time than was
deemed necessary to vindicate the state's penal interest in his case. The
(1965), for discussions of the disadvantages faced in the criminal process by persons
unable to secure pretrial release on bail.
103. See State v. Mathewson, 477 P.2d 222, 224 (Ore. App. 1970).
104. Agata, Time Served Under a Reversed Sentence or Conviction-A Proposal
and a Basis for Decision, 25 MONT. L. REV. 3, 41 (1963).
105. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
106. Id. at 719.
107. See 401 U.S. at 398.
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federal courts have recognized the constitutional implication of such a
result'0 8 but countered it by decreeing that whenever mathematically
possible a sentencing court would be deemed to have taken the presen-
tence time into account when less than the maximum term was imposed.
None of the federal courts have offered any factual support for this
conclusion, and the only reason advanced at the time of its adoption
was predicated upon the inconvenience that would be experienced by
the courts adjudicating claims for credit.10 9
It would seem that administrative convenience, not to mention jus-
tice, would be served better by a contrary rule; that is, unless the record
is clear that the trial court did indeed award full credit (including
earned good time and a recognition that presentence confinement
would be counted toward parole eligibility), the presumption should
be that credit was not given and the state should bear the burden of
proving the contrary. In other words, if the requirement of credit for
presentence confinement is of constitutional dimension, it can hardly
be satisfied by an unsubstantiated "presumption" that a trial judge
complied with the rule.
The basis for the conclusive presumption adopted in Stapf is un-
dermined by the facts in the same case. If trial judges were ob-
viously ignoring presentence jail time in certain cases by handing
out maximum terms, upon what basis could it be assumed that they
were any more cognizant of presentence custody when awarding less
than maximum terms? Consider the candid testimony of one distin-
guished federal judge offered in support of the 1966 amendment to
section 3568:
[I] think [the amendment] would work better than under the
most benevolent judge who is carefully trying to accord credit
[for presentence custody] because in any court, and I think es-
pecially a Federal court, many of the criminal offenses are not
serious ones. I am not talking about bank robbery or the occa-
sional treason case. But it is almost true, as someone said to
me, the Federal criminal court is sort of a glorified police court
so far as the crimes are concerned . . . . [W]e have a lot . . .
of defendants, often 50 or even a 100, on a week's calendar,
and we move pretty fast, and it is just another detail imposed
on the judge under the present system to remember. I may for-
get. I do not mean to, but just inadvertently. I have got four
defendants, all in the same bill, and two of them are out on bonds,
one has been released, one is in jail. I forget he has been in jail.
I do not remember that when I have been through 2 hours of hear-
ing testimony and determining guilt.
108. See notes 40-63 & accompanying text supra.
109. Stapf v. United States, 367 F.2d 326, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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So inadvertently I fail to give him credit. This is a better
way. I do not have to rely on memory. .... 110
If federal judges have difficulty taking presentence time into ac-
count when handling 50 to 100 cases per week, it is doubtful that lower
court judges in urban areas handling that many cases in a day---or
even a morning-will carefully calculate a sentence to reflect time al-
ready served."'
In short, the validity of any presumption of credit for presentence
time served depends upon proof of the existence of a nationwide ju-
dicial practice of taking presentence custody into account at the time
of sentencing. We must be able to infer from that fact that credit is
fully and fairly given in all cases. As in the case of the rule applied
to determine the validity of statutory presumptions, there should be a
rational connection between the fact proved and the fact presumed."'
Recently, the Supreme Court of the United States held that
a criminal statutory presumption must be regarded as "irrational"
or "arbitrary," and hence unconstitutional, unless it can at least
be said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact is
more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is
made to depend. 11
The test should be no less stringent when dealing with a ju-
dicially created rule of law which asserts that judges always take pre-
sentence time into account when sentencing offenders, and therefore a
person who has been held in pretrial custody and who receives less than
the maximum term for his crime has been given full credit for that
time. As pointed out above, the major defect in this presumption is
that the "fact" as to existence of such a judicial practice is at best an
unsupported assertion."14  Even if it were proved, it cannot be said
with substantial assurance that such practice results in full credit in
all cases where it is due.115
110. Hearings on Federal Bail Procedures Before Subcomm. of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 1st Sess. 146 (1965) (testimony of the Hon. J. Braxton
Craven, Jr., chief judge of the United States District Court for the Western District
of North Carolina). At the time of this statement Judge Craven had served nine
years on the state and federal bench. Currently, he is serving on the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
111. See generally Foote, Vagrancy-type Law and its Administration, 104 U. OF
PA. L. REv. 603 (1956); Katz, Municipal Courts: Another Urban 111, 20 CAsE W. Ras.
L REv. 87 (1968).
112. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943).
113. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969).
114. Cf. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566-67 (1969) (suggesting that
penal consequences should not flow from unproved behavioral hypotheses). See also
People ex rel. Carrol v. Frye, 35 Ill. 604, 608, 221 N.E.2d 262, 263 (1966).
115. Cf. Booker v. Groat, 7 Mich. App. 705, 708-09, 153 N.W.2d 178, 180 (1967).
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The Indeterminate Sentence with a Minimum Term
In some states a number of criminal laws dictate indeterminate
sentences with prescribed minimum terms.1 16 Here there is no ready
analogy to be found in the layout time cases, but the constitutional prin-
ciples which support those decisions would seem also to require that
credit for presentence custody be applied to reduce the minimum as well
as the maximum term of the sentence.1 1 7
One would expect at this point to encounter the argument that all
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require is the deduction of time
from the maximum or "long side." However, the disparity between
persons not able to post bond and those who do is as apparent in
the context of the minimum sentence as it is in the case of the maxi-
mum. Service of all or a portion of the minimum sentence determines
parole eligibility." 8  If presentence custody is not taken into account,
the person unable to make pretrial bond must serve a longer period of
time before becoming eligible for parole. This disadvantageous re-
sult would have been avoided by a person able to secure his release
pending trial.
Also, since minimum as well as maximum terms are reduced by
good time credits, a prisoner held in presentence custody for want of
bail suffers further disadvantage unless, after sentence, he is cred-
ited with the appropriate good time earned in connection with the pre-
sentence custody. In other words, the presentence time should be
treated in all respects as if it had been served pursuant to the sen-
ence. 1
9
Denial of Presentence Credit as Double Punishment
Presentence Confinement as Punishment
Failure to award a prisoner full credit for time spent in presen-
tence custody is vulnerable to attack on double jeopardy grounds in
116. See, e.g., IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-3039 (Bums Supp. 1970).
117. The only state statute that makes this explicit was recently enacted in In-
diana. Indiana Code 1971, 35-8, ch. 2.5, added by Senate Enrolled Act No. 22,
Feb., 1972. The ABA SENTENCING STANDARDS, supra note 2, § 3.6, and the MODEL
PENAL CODE § 7.09 (Proposed Official Draft 1962), take care to point out that such
credit is to be applied to miimum as well as maximum terms.
118. See, e.g., Wilson v. North Carolina, 438 F.2d 284, 286 (4th Cir. 1971).
119. See, e.g., Indiana Code 1971, 35-8, ch. 2.5, added by Senate Enrolled Act
No. 22, Feb., 1972; MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 279, § 33A (Supp. 1971); Royster v.
McGinnis, 332 F. Supp. 973 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), prob. juris. noted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3455
(U.S. Mar. 20, 1972).
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all of the cases in which the equal protection and due process analysis
applies. However, the double jeopardy attack is more broad since it is
available not only to persons financially unable to post pretrial bail,
but also to persons held in connection with nonbailable offenses and
even to persons who choose to remain in custody pending disposi-
tion of their cases.120
In North Carolina v. Pearce121 the United States Supreme
Court held that the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy
"is violated when punishment already exacted for an offense is not
fully 'credited' in imposing sentence upon a new conviction for the
same offense.' 22  The time credit aspect of Pearce deals only with
the problem of time served pursuant to a reversed sentence, and to date
both state and federal courts have either ignored its application to pre-
sentence custody, 23 or refused to apply its time credit feature in the
presentence context. 124
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected a prisoner's Pearce-
based claim of credit for his presentence jail time:
In referring to the "punishment already exacted", the Court [in
Pearce] consistently refers to the time spent in prison. We find
nothing in the opinion to indicate that the Court intended the
holding to apply to time spent in the county jail pending trial
when state law provides that punishment for the offense charged
120. For example, a person substantially certain of conviction and "hard time"
might elect to begin service of his sentence and therefore refuse bail. It is readily
conceded that this would be a rare occurrence. See Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal
Procedure or a Third "Model" of the Criminal Process, 79 YALE L.J. 357, 387 (1970).
121. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
122. Id. at 718. In a footnote the Court emphasized that for credit to be full it
must include "the time credited during the service of the first prison sentence for
good behavior, etc." Id. at 719 n.13. It seems reasonable to assume that by "etc." the
Court meant that time should be treated as though it had been served pursuant to
the subsequent valid sentence, and therefore would be considered in determining parole
eligibility and other benefits or privileges based upon time served.
123. See, e.g., Harper v. State, 462 S.W.2d 847, 849 (Ark. 1971); Richardson v.
State, 243 So. 2d 598 (Fla. App. 1971).
124. See, e.g., Gremillion v. Henderson, 425 F.2d 1293, 1294 (5th Cir. 1970);
Arsad v. Henry, 317 F. Supp. 162, 163 (E.D.N.C. 1970); Gross v. Sarver, 307 F. Supp.
1105, 1106 (E.D. Ark. 1970); State v. Kennedy, 106 Ariz. 190, 192, 472 P.2d 59,
61 (1970); Ibsen v. Warden, 417 P.2d 229 (Nev. 1970); Bennett v. State, 450 S.W.2d
652, 656 (Tex. Cr. App. 1970).
One federal circuit court has recognized "substantial constitutional questions"
raised by a habeas corpus petitioner who claimed he was subjected to double jeopardy
by the state's refusal to credit his maximum 18 year murder sentence with the two
years six weeks he spent in pretrial custody. Wright v. Warden, 429 F.2d 1101
(4th Cir. 1970). The case was remanded to the state courts for reconsideration in
light of Pearce.
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is to be by confinement in a penitentiary or prison or depart-
ment of correction. Where a defendant is unable to make bail
such confinement in jail in such cases is not designed to exact
punishment for the offense charged, but to insure the defendant's
appearance at his trial.125
The Supreme Court of Arizona has taken a similar position, 126
quoting at length and adopting the "logic" of a ninety-six-year-old
New York case127 which proceeds as follows: Punishment is the pen-
alty that the criminal suffers for his offense; it cannot legally be en-
dured until the person is properly convicted of a crime and properly
sentenced upon that conviction; therefore,
any pain or penalty which the offender has suffered before con-
viction and before sentence has been pronounced upon him is il-
legal, or is due to some demand [such as being held in lieu of
bail to assure presence at trial] of the law other than that based
upon his conviction.' 28
Also, there are qualitative differences between presentence and post-
sentence confinement:
[lmportant parts of the sentence are the place of imprisonment,
to wit: in a State prison, and the manner of detention there, to
wit: at hard labor. When the relator lay in the county jail, he
was not enduring these parts of the sentence; he was not in State
prison; he was not at labor. How then can the time he lay in the
county jail be reckoned a part of the time for which the law
adjudged him to be at labor in the State Prison? 29
These cases advance three arguments against mandatory award
credit for presentence custody whether or not the sum of the presen-
tence time and the sentence exceeds the maximum term permitted by
statute. Each of these three arguments will be considered separately.
Presentence Custody Is Not Punishment
The first argument is that time spent in presentence custody is not
punishment because it is not served pursuant to any sentence. This ar-
gument is worthy of the combined wits of the Red Queen and Colonel
Cathcart.' s0 The proposition might just as well be:
125. Bennett v. State, 450 S.W.2d 652, 657 (Tex. Cr. App. 1970).
126. State v. Kennedy, 106 Ariz. 190, 472 P.2d 59 (1970).
127. People ex rel. Stokes v. Warden, 66 N.Y. 342 (1876).
128. Id. at 345.
129. Id. at 346.
130. Cf. King v. United States, 98 F.2d 291, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1938): "The Gov-
ernment's brief suggests, in the vein of The Mikado, that because the first sentence
was void appellant 'has served no sentence but has merely spent time in the peni-
tentiary'; that since he should not have been imprisoned as he was, he was not im-
prisoned at all .... As other corollaries it might be suggested that he is liable in
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An innocent person cannot be punished for a crime;
A person accused of crime and held in custody prior to con-
viction is presumed to be innocent.
Therefore, a person held in custody prior to conviction can-
not suffer punishment.' 3 '
Like Alice, one gets the feeling that there's something wrong here
somewhere.' What we have is a variation of the legal word game
wherein a restrictive definition of a term is used to avoid a realistic
analysis of a problem. For example, until very recently juveniles ac-
cused of delinquency and persons subject to other forms of compul-
sory commitment predicated on criminal conduct were deprived of sig-
nificant procedural and substantive rights because courts chose to label
the proceedings leading to such confinement as "civil" rather than
"criminal." However, the Supreme Court has made it clear that a ju-
dicial or statutory definition of a term will not control constitutional
analysis.133
Without attempting to define punishment,' if what happens to
a man held in jail prior to his conviction is not much different (or per-
quasi-contract for the value of his board and lodging, and criminally liable for
obtaining them under false pretenses. We cannot take this optimistic view."
131. Of course, if we pursue this line of reasoning we may conclude that a person
presumed to be innocent may not be held at all.
132. C. DODGSON, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 88 (1902). The relevant
passage is quoted in Dershowitz, The Law of Dangerousness: Some Fictions About
Predictions, 23 J. LEGAL ED. 24 (1970); The Queen said:
"There's the King's Messenger. He's in prison now, being punished; and the
trial doesn't even begin till next Wednesday; and of course the crime comes last
of all.
"Suppose he never commits the crime? asked Alice.
"That would be all the better, wouldn't it? the Queen responded ...
"Alice felt there was no denying that 'Of course it would be all the better,' she
said; but it wouldn't be all the better his being punished.
"You're wrong. . . said the Queen. Were you ever punished?
"Only for faults, said Alice.
"And you were all the better for it, I know! the Queen said triumphantly.
"Yes, but then I had done the things I was punished for, said Alice. That
makes all the difference.
"But if you hadn't done them the Queen said, 'that would have been better still;
better, and better, and better!' Her voice went higher with each 'better' till it got
quite to a squeak. ...
"Alice thought, 'There's a mistake here somewhere .. .
133. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605,
609-10 (1967).
134. See generally H. PACKER, TE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 19-21,
62-70 (1968).
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haps even worse) than what happens to him after sentence, there can
be no basis for distinguishing one period of custody from the other for
the purpose of affording him constitutional protection against double
punishment. Consider, for example, the case of D who is accused
of petty theft and is held for two months in the county jail before being
sentenced to serve six months in the same jail. When D returns to the
jail after sentence he is treated no differently and suffers no dis-
comforts in addition to those he suffered before having been sentenced.
There is no rational basis for treating the presentence period dif-
ferently than the postsentence period for purposes extending to D the
protection against double jeopardy.
Moreover, the appalling conditions that exist in local jails through-
out the country are becoming a matter of general knowledge. 18 5
Consider the following partial listing of "horribles" compiled in a re-
cent law review comment:
In a Florida jail, a seventeen-year-old runaway, held on a stolen
car charge, is strangled in the cell he shares with eighteen other
men, many already convicted and sentenced felons. A judge
terms the jail a "cesspool" and a "snakepit." In New York, a
thirty-three-year-old Puerto Rican gang member, awaiting trial
in the Tombs, goes mad in his cell and hangs himself. A Board
of Corrections Commission reports that "the intricate system of
criminal justice . . . succeeded only in deranging [the victim] and
ultimately . . . it permitted his destruction." The Commission
concludes that "[I]f we kept our animals in the Central Park Zoo in
the way we cage fellow human beings in the Tombs, a citizens com-
mittee would be organized, and prominent community leaders would
be protesting the inhumanity of our society. . .".. In Ohio, 272
inmates, including both convicted criminals and suspects awaiting
trial, are confined in a 76-year-old jail built originally to house
150 men. A court concludes that the unventilated and unillumi-
nated cells, where underfed inmates are forced to sleep on floors
dampened by water from the overflowing toilets, constitute cruelty
. . . comparable to the Chinese water torture.136
Assuring the Accused's Presence at Trial
The second argument is that the pretrial custody is justified be-
cause it serves the legitimate interest of the state in assuring the ac-
cused's presence at this trial. Accepting the legitimacy of this state in-
terest and accepting also the legitimacy of the bail system as a rational
135. See, e.g., Justice on Trial, NEWS EEK, March 8, 1971, at 16; The Shame of
the Prisons, Tan, Jan. 18, 1971, at 48.
136. Comment, Courts, Corrections, and the Eighth Amendment: Encouraging
Prison Reform by Releasing Inmates, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1060, 1061 (1971). See also
Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182 (D. Ark. 1971).
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means of preserving that interest, it does not follow that infliction of a
disadvantage upon an accused that is not reasonably necessary to the
interest the state seeks to preserve is warranted. In other words, the
bail system contemplates that the balance between the individual's in-
terest in personal freedom and the state's interest in having the person
available to answer to a criminal charge will be struck in favor of the
state when the individual is unable to satisfy conditions precedent to
his release. Basic fairness to a person who has been forced to ac-
cept this alternative would seem to require that he suffer no more than
is necessary to achieve the state's interest sought to be preserved through
pretrial detention.' 37 The state's interests are fully served by keep-
ing the person in jail pending trial. Treatment of the period of pre-
sentence detention as dead time amounts to additional punishment
bearing no relation to any legitimate state interest. Unless this time
is fully credited on the sentence imposed for the offense or acts in
connection with which the prisoner was held, he has been denied a sub-
stantive right.
Qualitative Differences Between Pretrial and Postsentence Cus-
tody
The third argument is that there are qualitative differences be-
tween custody before trial and custody pursuant to sentence and there-
fore it is inappropriate to treat the former as offsetting the latter. If
this is an acceptable reason for refusing to recognize presentence
jail time in some cases, one day of jail time might often be worth two
or more days of prison time. 1 8 However, such attempted calculations
are obviously ridiculous. One day's lost freedom is like another. Any
attempt to weight qualitative differences in presentence custody as
opposed to postsentence custody would be futile, and no jurisdic-
tion that allows credit for presentence time as a matter of right has at-
tempted any such distinction.
Double Jeopardy Principles and Presentence Confinement
The double jeopardy (multiple punishment) rationale applies
with equal force in all the situations discussed above in the context of
equal protection. Its most obvious application is in the case where
the sum of the formal sentence and the presentence time exceeds the
137. Even the "preventive detention" scheme contemplates credit for time spent
in pretrial custody via 18 U.S.C. § 3568 (1970).
138. See notes 135-36 & accompanying text supra.
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maximum term permitted by statute. Similarly, the double punish-
ment rationale applies where the sum of the presentence time and the
formal minimum exceed the statutory minimum less earned good time.
Finally, any conclusive presumption that time is taken into account
in the case of less than maximum sentence is no more valid in this
context than in the context of equal protection.
Inhibiting the Constitutional Right to a Full and Fair Trial
A person who must await trial in jail and who is aware that he is
serving dead time (and this will always be the case where a man faces
a minimum mandatory penalty) is likely to forego a vigorous and
time consuming defense. He may choose to waive challenges to the suf-
ficiency of the indictment, the method of selecting grand and petit
juries, the venue of the case, the admissibility of seized evidence, and
in order to get his case to trial he may waive trial by jury. He may
even forgo the trial completely and plead guilty just to start his time
running. These pressures are particularly strong upon one who has
already spent several months in jail and whose trial may still be months
away.
Defense lawyers are aware that the longer they delay trial of a
case, the better bargain they may be able to make for their clients in plea
negotiating sessions. 139 Moreover, delay is an effective means of fee
collection; despite the questionable ethics of the lawyers and the
courts that allow such tactics to be used, the strategy seems to work.
The person held in jail, however, is at a marked disadvantage.
He is unlikely to see delay as a favorable defense strategy when each
day is dead time. Since his bargaining position is weakened by the
fact that he is in jail, he is not likely to get as good a deal as, for ex-
ample, his codefendant who has been released on bail. 140
In this context the dead time prisoner can assert that the potential
of punishment in addition to his minimum, maximum, or judicially
determined "appropriate" sentence imposes an impermissible burden
on his exercise of his constitutional right to trial and trial by jury.141
139. See generally Alsehuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U.
Ca. L. REv. 50 (1971).
140. White, A Proposal for Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process, 119 U. PA.
L. REv. 439, 444, 450 (1971).
This is but another example of how the existing criminal justice system operates
perversely. Our 6bjective ought to be to devise fair methods of avoiding the use of
delay as a tactical weapon.
141. Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968).
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In North Carolina v. Pearce.42 the Supreme Court stated that an
announced practice of imposing a heavier sentence upon every
reconvicted defendant for the explicit purpose of punishing the de-
fendant for ... getting his original conviction set aside would
penalize those who choose to exercise constitutional rights [and]
would be patently unconstitutional. 143
Similarly, if a trial court is without power to give (or follows a
consistent pattern of not giving) full credit for presentence custody, a
jailed defendant is inhibited from insisting upon the full range of rights
due him as a criminal defendant. If he is denied credit, he is in a very
real sense penalized for exercising those rights due to the time re-
quired for proper adjudication. 144  Unlike Pearce the validity of
this argument does not depend upon any showing of vindictiveness on
the part of the trial court. In Pearce the Court recognized a limited
basis upon which a sentence, after reversal of a prior conviction, could
be increased. A trial judge could, consistent with the principles of dou-
ble jeopardy, impose a heavier sentence the second time around in
light of "events subsequent to the first trial that may have thrown new
light upon the defendant's 'life, health, habits, conduct, and mental
and moral propensities.'"'" Since proper application of double
jeopardy standards precludes any exception to the award of credit
for presentence confinement, there can be no question of proper bases
for refusing credit. In some instances, however, good time credits
otherwise attributable to presentence confinement could be denied in
light of the defendant's behavior while in jail-e.g., an attempt to es-
cape.
If courts are expected to perform the calculation as to time credit,
it would be well to require them to do so in writing leaving no room for
"presumption" as to how they counted the time. 140  The better
142. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
143. Id. at 723-24, quoting United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968).
144. Nothing in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), would detract from
this approach. There the Supreme Court rejected the petitioner's argument that the
death penalty feature of the kidnapping statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1970), de-
clared unconstitutional in Jackson, induced his guilty plea and therefore rendered it
invalid. The argument here is not that guilty pleas entered to avoid dead time are
invalid, but that the potential of dead time imposes an impermissible burden on the
exercise of constitutional rights, such as trial by jury, motions to suppress illegally
obtained evidence, etc., which take time. The appropriate remedy is the award of
credit for such time.
145. 395 U.S. at 723 (emphasis added), quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S.
241, 245 (1949).
146. This approach is urged in Pearce. See 395 U.S. at 726.
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approach, however, is that adopted in the federal time credit statute 47
which makes the award of credit for presentence time an administra-
tive function, leaving the court free to determine the length of sen-
tence necessary to vindicate the penal interests of the state without
reference to presentence custody.' 48
Credit for Time Pending Appeal
A number of state statutes mandate the award of time credit to
a person held in jail after conviction pending appeal. 149  In other
states the decision to award credit for time in custody pending appeal is
discretionary. 50
Before the adoption in 1949 of rule 38 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, sentence was automatically stayed as to a de-
fendant who appealed and no time credit was awarded for time spent
in custody unless the appellant elected to commence service of his sen-
tence pending appeal.' 51  As originally adopted, rule 38(a)(2) re-
quired a specific election not to commence service of sentence before
time served pending appeal would be treated as dead time. The rea-
son behind the rule was to permit the defendant to remain in the vi-
cinity of the trial or the appellate court to assist counsel in the prepa-
ration of his appeal.152 If the appellant elected not to commence service
of his sentence and if the appeal failed, the defendant received no credit
for any of the time between his conviction and delivery to the place
designated by the attorney general for service of sentence.'" 3 In 1966
rule 38(a)(2) was amended and in its present form eliminates the
election feature and its dead time consequences. 154 The trial court is
authorized to
147. 18 U.S.C. § 3568 (1970).
148. See note 67 & accompanying text supra.
149. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2505 (Supp. 1970); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15-186.1 (Supp. 1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-29-24 (Supp. 1971); VA. CODE
ANN. § 53-29 (Supp. 1971).
150. See, e.g., TENN. CODE Am. § 40-3102 (Supp. 1970) (appellant must file
request for credit with Supreme COurt within five days after court announces its deci-
sion); TExAs CODE CRiM. PRo. ANN. art. 42.03 (Supp. 1971) (defendant who appeals
may be resentenced if appeal is unsuccessful to give credit for time served in jail pend-
ing appeal). However, the discretionary feature has been read out of the Texas
statute. Ex parte Griffith, 457 S.W.2d 60, 63-64 (Tex. Cr. App. 1970); Robinson v.
Bleto, 426 F.2d 797 (5th Cir. 1970). But see State v. Kreller, 255 La. 982, 233 So. 2d
906 (1970).
151. 8A I. MooRE, FEERAL PRACTIcE 38.01 38-3 (R. Cipes ed. 1970).
152. Id. 1 38.02.
153. See, e.g., United States v. Pruitt, 397 F.2d 502, 503-04 (7th Cir. 1968).
154. Advisory COmmittee Note, 18 U.S.C. Rule 38 (1970). 8A J. MooRE, FEDER-
mRAL PRAcTicE 38.02 (R. Cipes ed. 1970).
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recommend to the Attorney General that the defendant be re-
tained at, or transferred to, a place of confinement near the place
of trial or the place where his appeal is to be heard, for a period
reasonably necessary to permit the defendant to assist in the prep-
aration of his appeal to the court of appeals.1 55
The equal protection/due process rationale of Williams and Tate
and the double jeopardy rationale of Pearce apply with equal vigor to
the question of credit for time spent in confinement pending appeal.
Indeed, state and federal courts have been more willing to accept
Pearce's bar against multiple punishment in this context than in the
case of presentence confinement. 5 6 However, as to both periods,
the question remains whether the constitutional principles apply retro-
actively to cover persons in state and federal penal institutions who
have received no (or less than full) credit for time served prior to
sentence or pending appeal.
Retroactivity of Credit for Presentence Confinement
The various jurisdictions are split insofar as the retroactive appli-
cation of their time credit statutes is concerned. Illinois and Pennsyl-
vania courts have held their presentence time credit statutes to operate
retroactively;' 57 Michigan and New Mexico courts have found similar
statutes to be nonretroactive. 15 s Although Congress expressed its in-
tent to make the 1960 and 1966 amendments to section 3568 apply
prospectively only, the Second Circuit ruled in Sobell' 59 that the 1960
155. 18 U.S.C. Rule 38 (1970).
156. Wilson v. North Carolina, 438 F.2d 284, 286-87 (4th Cir. 1971); Robinson
v. Beto, 426 F.2d 797, 798 (5th Cir. 1970); Cole v. North Carolina, 419 F.2d 127
(4th Cir. 1969). Compare Bennett v. State, 450 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. Cr. App. 1970),
with Ex parte Griffith, 457 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. Cr. App. 1970) (decided before the
Fifth Circuit's ruling in Robinson v. Beto, supra).
157. People ex rel. Carroll v. Frye, 35 Ill. 2d 604, 221 N.E.2d 262 (1966);
Commonwealth v. Snyder, 427 Pa. 83, 233 A.2d 530 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 983
(1968). The Pennsylvania court's analysis was aided by language in statute referring
to "any person who has been convicted," see PENN. STAT. ANN. § 19-898 (1964),
indicating a legislative intent to extend the benefits of the statute to persons sentenced
before its effective date. The Illinois statute, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 119-3
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1971), explicitly limited its application to sentences imposed after
July 1, 1965. However, in Carroll, supra, the petitioner argued successfully that as
to him the nonretroactive applications of the statute would work a denial of equal
protection and due process of law because he had received a mandatory minimum
sentence, and therefore any assumption that the trial judge awarded credit would be
erroneous. Cf. Sobell v. United States, 407 F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 1969) (con-
curring opinion).
158. Bowen v. Recorder's Court, 384 Mich. 55, 179 N.W.2d 377 (1970); State v.
Luna, 79 N.M. 307, 442 P.2d 797 (1968).
159. Sobell v. United States, 407 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1969).
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amendment, as interpreted in Stapf v. United States,160 applied retro-
actively to a defendant who in 1951 received a maximum 30 year
sentence.
161
Federal courts have refused to interfere with the dead time con-
sequences of elections not to commence service of sentence pending
appeal under the old rule 38 (a) (2) of the Federal rules of Criminal
Procedure. 62 Likewise, the North Carolina Supreme Court refused to
apply retroactively that state's statute requiring credit for time in cus-
tody pending appeal. 6 '
These inconsistent approaches' are likely to be submerged in
the retroactive application of constitutional principles derived from
Pearce, Williams, and Tate insofar as they are applicable to dead time.
Every prisoner, state or federal, who has not received full credit for
the time he spent in custody pending trial, sentence or appeal should
receive credit without regard to the date sentence was imposed. The
Supreme Court stated in Stovall v. Denno: '"
[T]he criteria guiding resolution of the question [of the retroactive
effect of a holding of unconstitutionality] implicate (a) the pur-
160. 367 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
161. 407 F.2d at 181.
162. Duke v. Blackwell, 429 F.2d 531, 532 (5th Cir. 1970); Tandler v. Black-
well, 412 F.2d 780, 781 (5th Cir. 1969); Vacarcel v. United States, 409 F.2d 211, 213
(2d Cir. 1969); Sobell v. Attorney General, 400 F.2d 986, 990 (3d Cir. 1968);
United States v. Pruitt, 397 F.2d 502, 504 (7th Cir. 1968). But see Gibson v. Sard,
391 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1967); cf. Atkinson v. United States, 418 F.2d 1311 (8th
Cir. 1969).
163. State v. Virgil, 276 N.C. 217, 226, 172 S.E.2d 28, 34 (1970).
164. This inconsistency pervades cases decided by the same court. In Robinson
v. Beto, 426 F.2d 797 (5th Cir. 1970), the court ruled that Texas could not, in light of
Pearce, deny credit to a defendant who spent approximately one year in jail while he
appealed his conviction: "Due process requires that a state, once it establishes avenues
of appellate review, must keep those avenues free of unreasoned distinctions that
impede open and equal access to the courts .... A defendant's right of appeal
must be free and unfettered .... It is clear that under the Texas procedure, only
those who appeal their convictions run the risk of longer imprisonment. Those who
choose not to appeal begin to serve their sentence on the day sentence is pro-
nounced .... Those who choose to appeal, however, begin their sentence on the
day the Court of Criminal Appeals issues its mandate .... After issuance of the
mandate, the sentencing judge may or may not resentence the defendant, giving him
credit for whatever time he has spent in jail pending the appeal. That statutory
scheme tends to impede open and equal access to appellate review since it may deter a
defendant from appealing because of a fear that the sentencing judge will not give
him credit for the time he has spent in jail pending appeal." Id. at 798-99.
However, in Duke v. Blackwell, 429 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1970), the same
court seems to have summarily rejected similar arguments made by a federal prisoner
who received a maximum five year sentence under the Dyer Act.
165. 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967).
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pose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the re-
liance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and
(c) the effect of the administration of justice of a retroactive ap-
plication of the new standards.
These standards were developed to test the retroactivity of
changes in criminal procedure, such as limitations on police activity,
rather than to determine retroactive application of substantive require-
ments such as credit for pretrial confinement." 6  But even apply-
ing the restrictive criteria of Stovall, the case for retroactive application
seems clear. The purpose to be achieved in the award of credit for
presentence confinement is one of fundamental fairness to an indi-
vidual who otherwise would suffer loss of time because of the state's
purported overriding interest in having him available for trial or for
service of sentence. Certainly law enforcement authorities cannot
claim any reliance on the practice of depriving defendants credit for
time served. Finally, while there may be an administrative burden
placed upon officials in charge of prisons who will have to recompute
release dates for prisoners who have not received full credit for time
served, no new trials or findings of fact need be made. A simple
arithmetical computation is all that is required, and it should be ob-
vious to all that the individual interest in freedom here outweighs the
relatively slight administrative burden. 6 ' Indeed, it appears that some
courts already have begun the retroactive application of Pearce in
dead time cases, at least insofar as credit for time pending appeal is con-
cerned.168
166. Compare Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966) and Desist v. United
States, 394 U.S. 244, 254 (1969) with Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 21 (1956) and
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Moreover, the extension of the Fifth
Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy to the states in Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784 (1969), has been held to be retroactive. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436,
437 n.1 (1970); Wailer v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 396 (1970) (Mr. Justice Brennan
concurring).
167. At least one federal court has held that the time credit portion of North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1965), applies retroactively. See Allen v. Hender-
son, 434 F.2d 26 (5th Cir. 1970) wherein the court found the "reliance" and "admin-
istrative impact" criteria of Stovall entitled to little weight in the context of time credit.
"Nothing more than a credit for punishment already exacted is involved. The same is
true as to the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application. ...
It is unlikely that new trials will be necessary. At the most nothing more than re-
sentencing will be required, and in some cases only a recomputation by prison offi-
cials." Id. at 28.
168. Wilson v. North Carolina, 438 F.2d 284, 286-87 (4th Cir. 1971); Robinson
v. Beto, 426 F.2d 797 (5th Cir. 1970); Ex parte Griffith, 457 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. Cr.
App. 1970). See also Sobell v. United States, 407 F.2d 180, 183-84 (2d Cir. 1969);
People ex rel. Carroll v. Frye, 35 Ill. 604, 608, 221 N.E.2d 262, 263 (1966).
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Criteria for Crediting Presentence Time
Once a constitutional right not to be subjected to the service of
dead time is recognized, the inquiry must shift to the criteria to be
satisfied before a prisoner may claim that right. Questions which
will be the most difficult to answer are: (1) Apart from being held in
jail prior to sentence, are there other forms of custody that must be rec-
ognized for credit purposes? (2) What, if any, is the requisite con-
nection between the basis for presentence detention and the offense
for which sentence is imposed? (3) Will a person held in presentence
custody in one jurisdiction be entitled to any credit for that time when
he is sentenced in another jurisdiction?
"Custody" for the Purpose of Credit
The largest number of cases in which credit for presentence
confinement is in issue will involve total restraint in jail. In these situa-
tions the case for credit is clear, and any attempt to adjust credit in re-
lation to the quality of the total restraint would be inappropriate.0 9
The second largest number of cases involve pretrial commitments
to state mental hospitals for determinations of competency to stand
trial or in anticipation of the insanity defense. In those jurisdictions
having statutes requiring credit for presentence jail time, a number
have allowed credit on sentence for compulsory pretrial commitment
to mental institutions. 170  These courts have recognized that this form
of custody differs little from confinement in jail,'7 1 and that it is
but another result of a conflict between individual freedom and the
public safety where the former has lost.17 2
169. See text accompanying note 138 supra.
170. Cephus v. United States, 389 F.2d 317 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Sawyer v. Clark,
386 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1967); In re Steam's Petition, 343 Mass. 53, 55, 175 N.E.2d
470, 472 (1961) (involving pretrial commitment of over four years); People v. "Noble,
28 Misc. 2d 646, 216 N.Y.S.2d 541 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Commonwealth v. Jones, 211
Pa. Super. 366, 236 A.2d 834 (1967). Some states make express statutory provision
for credit pretrial time spent in a mental hospital in connection with the offense.
IOWA CODE § 246.38; N.J. RULES CRIm. PRO. tit. 3, §§ 7-10(h) (1969). Cf. People
v. Foster, 67 Cal. 2d 604, 432 P.2d 976, 63 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1967); In re Schneider's
Estate, 130 Ill. App. -, 264 N.E.2d 805 (1970).
171. See, e.g., Cephus v. United States, 389 F.2d 317 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
172. See In re Schneider's Estate, 130 Ill. App. -, 264 N.E.2d 805, 807-08
(1970). When a prisoner serving a sentence is transferred to a hospital for treatment
there is no question of his time being interrupted. Similarly, even in states where
credit on sentence for time on parole is discretionary, the time spent as a result of
compulsory commitment to a mental hospital in connection with parole or an alleged
parole violation is counted as part of the pre-existing sentence. In re Bennett, 71
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Jurisdictions that have denied credit have done so under the as-
sertion of lack of power to award credit for any presentence time, 173
or on the ground that the statute allowing credit for presentence jail
time does not encompass hospital time.'74 Courts that have allowed
credit for pretrial commmitment for mental observation have done so
without regard to whether the commitment was requested by defense
counsel, by the state or by the court. 17  However, the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court has suggested that the time during which an accused
undergoes court-ordered mental observation should not offset a sentence
because such confinement is for the benefit of the defendant and to
assist counsel in the conduct of his defense.' 76  This argument ignores
the total restraint involved in pretrial mental hospital commitments and
the fact the commitment is based on a criminal charge. An accused
may choose (or be advised) to forego a determination of competency or
an evaluation of his criminal responsibility if the months (or even years)
Cal. 2d 117, 121, 454 P.2d 33, 35, 77 Cal. Rptr. 457, 459 (1969); State v. Ewell,
234 Md. 56, 59, 198 A.2d 275, 277 (1964). For a discussion of credit for time spent
on parole status see Comment, A la Recherche du Temps Perdu: The Constitutionality
of Denial of Credit on Revocation of Parole, 35 U. CH. L. REV. 762 (1968).
There are a number of cases where credit has been denied for time served after
conviction and commitment under sexual psychopath or drug addict rehabilitation stat-
utes, and where the treatment is terminated in favor of a prison sentence for the
same offense. E.g., People v. McCowan, 244 Cal. App. 2d 624, 628, 53 Cal. Rptr.
406, 408 (1966); People v. Reynoso, 64 Cal. 2d 432, 436, 412 P.2d 812, 814, 50 Cal.
Rptr. 468, 470 (1966) (civil commitment for treatment not punishment); State v.
Braggs, 9 Ohio Misc. 32, 35, 221 N.E.2d 493, 495 (Juv. Ct. Cuyahoga Co. 1966);
State v. Newell, 126 Vt. 525, 526-27, 236 A.2d 656, 658 (1967) (no credit for 20
months served after conviction on a plea of guilty to two counts of assault with intent
to rape where time was served pursuant to sexual psychopath commitment, and where
the state prison was designated as the place of commitment). But see People v.
Foster, 67 Cal. 2d 604, 607, 432 P.2d 976, 978, 63 Cal. Rptr. 280, 290 (1967) (de-
fendant entitled to credit on sentence for time spent in confinement due to invalid
sex offender commitment).
173. Young v. State, 448 P.2d 294 (Okla. Cr. 1968); State v. Sanders, 251
S.C. 431, 445-46, 163 S.E.2d 220, 228 (1968).
174. Marsh v. Henderson, 221 Tenn. 42, 48-49, 424 S.W.2d 193, 196 (1968).
Petitioner was arrested and charged with first degree murder in 1954. He was found
incompetent to stand trial and was committed to a mental hospital where he was held
for the next 11Y2 years. In 1965 he pleaded guilty to second degree murder and
received a sentence of 20 years. The court refused to allow credit for the time spent
in the mental hospital on the ground that the statute, TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-3102
(Supp. 1970), permitted credit only for time a prisoner is held "in the county jail or
workhouse." In response to the petitioner's argument that the confinement in the men-
tal hospital was tantamount to being held in jail, the court responded that he was
being held for treatment and not for punishment.
175. E.g., Sawyer v. Clark, 386 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
176. State v. Walker, 277 N.C. 403, 405, 177 S.E.2d 868, 871 (1970).
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he must spend in a mental institution for these purposes are treated as
dead time.
In another context, the emergence of alternatives to total con-
finement developed to offset the inequities of the bail system will neces-
sitate the development of a standard by which to determine the type of
pretrial restraint that may be taken into account for the purpose of credit
on a subsequent sentence. For example, an accused may be released
from jail during the day to go to his job but compelled to return to the
jail at night. Or, he may be freed to work during the week but be
required to spend weekends in jail. Likewise, a person may be at large
in the community but subject to limitations on his freedom, such as an
11 p.m. curfew, restrictions on travel outside the city, county or state,
or a requirement of periodic reporting to authorities as evidence of
continued availability for trial.177 In such cases a rather flexible
standard of custody warranting credit will have to be devised. Such
standards have been formulated for -use in other areas of the criminal
process for purposes of determining the legality of searches and seiz-
ures, 178 police interrogation 79 and the availability of habeas corpus. 80
In this context, although rejected in the analysis of total re-
straints, some qualitative evaluation of the type and nature of the re-
straint may be a prerequisite to the award of time credit. The re-
straint must be sufficiently akin to that imposed as a result of convic-
tion and sentence to qualify for credit. Any attempt to "weight"
presentence restraint--e.g., treating two or three days under less than
total restraint as the equivalent of one day in prison-is rejected be-
cause of the impracticality of making such determinations.
A person released on a normal bail bond is subject to some re-
straint upon his freedom. For example, he may not be able to leave
the jurisdiction temporarily without notifying the court, but the re-
straint would seem to be too slight for award of credit. However, the
177. Some of these alternatives to the present bail system are suggested in
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRAnON OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: Tim CouRTS 39 (1967).
178. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968) ("whenever a police officer accosts an
individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person").
179. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (person entitled to the Mir-
anda warnings when subjected to "custodial interrogation" which means "questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.").
180. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 242 (1963) ("the custody and control of
the Parole Board involve significant restraints on [a person's] liberty because of his
conviction and sentence .. ).
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addition of other conditions, such as those listed above, may have a
pronounced inhibiting effect and may be more like restraints imposed
upon persons on probation or parole. The following is suggested as an
appropriate standard: A person convicted of a crime is entitled to
full credit on his sentence for any time prior to such sentence that he
was subjected to substantial restraint upon his freedom of movement
or actions, provided that such restraint was imposed in connection
with the offense or acts which resulted in the sentence. Mere release
on bail, without more, will not be considered a substantial restraint.
Admittedly, the suggested standard is very broad and indefinite, but
it does provide a guideline for administrative or trial court decisions
and for appellate review of those decisions.
The Necessary Connection Between
Sentence and Presentence Time
Constitutional Considerations
Obviously a prisoner should not be given credit for time that bears
no relation to his current sentence. If a prisoner could "bank" time
previosuly served in connection with offenses for which he was not
convicted, or where his conviction was invalidated, and he could apply
that time against a later offense, the
result [would be] something in the nature of a license to commit
some anti-social act or acts, the extent or scope of the license
measured by the amount of time the defendant has in the
"bank."' 8 '
One court has observed that "the time spent in jail prior to conviction
must, at least, bear an intimate and substantial relationship to the crime
for which such person is subsequently convicted."'1 2  Any limitation
based upon the "same offense" would be too severe. Very often a per-
son is arrested on one charge, indicted on another, and convicted of
still another. Yet each of these different charges may be based upon
the same acts. To allow for these shifts in prosecution theory and
for conviction of lesser included offenses, the federal statute requires
credit "for any days spent in custody in connection with the offense or
181. Agata, Time Served Under a Reversed Sentence or Conviction-A Proposal
and a Basis for Decision, 25 MONT. L. REv. 3, 46 (1963). The cases support this
view. See, e.g., United States ex rel. DiRienzo v. New Jersey, 423 F.2d 224, 226 n.3
(3d Cir. 1970); Harkey v. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., 356 Mass. 722, 252
N.E.2d 357 (1969); People ex rel. Manfro v. LaVallee, 33 App. Div. 2d 947, 948,
306 N.Y.S.2d 854, 855 (1970); In re Howell, 440 P.2d 209 (Okla. Cr. App. 1968).
182. Bernoff v. Amaroso, 188 Misc. 845, 847, 65 N.Y.S.2d 810, 813 (Sup. Ct.
1946).
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acts for which sentence was imposed."' 83 Similarly, the ABA minimum
standards call for credit "for all time spent in custody as a result of
the criminal charge for which a prison sentence is imposed or as a
result of the conduct on which such a charge is based."184
So long as the sentence and the presentence custody arise from
the same conduct, the requirements of due process and equal pro-
tection would seem to require credit in all cases where a person has
been financially unable to post bail. Persons who do post bail may
experience changes in the nature of the charges as they progress
through the criminal process, but they are able to avoid confinement
pending final disposition.
Similarly, the double jeopardy (multiple punishment) rationale
would apply when a person is convicted of a lesser included offense.' 85
However, it may be argued that if the charges are amended, say from
burglary to theft, where the latter is not a lesser included offense
within the former, the application of the "same evidence" test, 86
would not require credit to be given on the subsequent sentence. This
test ultimately may give way to a "same act" or "same transaction" ap-
proach, 87 but even when applied rigidly does not justify withholding
of credit for presentence custody. The "same evidence" test was de-
veloped to determine whether subsequent prosecutions are banned by
former acquittals or convictions and to determine the legality of multi-
ple sentences for related offenses. In the time credit situation none of
these problems are present. Looking back from conviction to arrest
it can usually be determined readily that the time already served was
in connection with that sentence and no other.'88 If credit could be
denied by the simple shifting of charges, prosecutors would be given
183. 18 U.S.C. § 3568 (1970). H.R. REP. No. 1541, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 17
(1966).
184. ABA SENTENCING STANDARDS, supra note 2, § 3.6. Indiana Code 1971,
35-8, ch. 2.5, added by Senate Enrolled Act No. 22, Feb., 1972.
185. Cf. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
186. Morgan v. Devine, 237 U.S. 632, 641 (1915) ("the test of identity of of-
fenses is whether the same evidence is required to sustain them."); United States v.
Bruni, 359 F.2d 807 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 826 (1966) ("Offenses are not
the same for the purposes of the double jeopardy clause simply because they arise
out of the same general cause of criminal conduct; they are the 'same' only when
'the evidence required to support a conviction upon one of them (the indictments)
would have been sufficient to warrant a conviction upon the other."').
187. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 454 (1970) (Brennan, I., concurring).
188. Admittedly, complications may arise in the cases of multiple sentences to
be served concurrently or consecutively. See Agata, Time Served Under a Revised
Sentence or Conviction-A Proposal and a Basis for Decision, 25 MoNT. L. REV. 3,
47-50 (1963).
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the power to alter the sentence and to control plea bargaining by amend-
ing or threatening to amend charges whereby time served would
become dead time.
Statutory Alternatives
The various statutory alternatives can best be illustrated by ex-
ample. Suppose that on June 1 D is arrested and charged with a bur-
glary allegedly committed on May 15. Bail is set at $2,000, and be-
cause he is indigent, D is unable to secure his release from jail. On
July 1, while still in jail, he is charged with a robbery that allgedly
was committed on May 1. As a result of the second charge, bail is in-
creased to $3,000. On September 1 D is tried for the May 15 bur-
glary and is acquitted. He remains in jail under the robbery charge,
and on October 1 he enters a plea of guilty to the lesser included
offense of aggravated assault and receives the maximum sentence of
five years. Should D be entitled to credit on his five-year sentence:
(1) for all time spent in jail from June 1; or (2) only for the time af-
ter the filing of the robbery charge on July 1; or (3) only for the
time between the date of his acquittal of burglary (Sept. 1) and his
conviction for aggravated assault (October 1)?
If the problem is approached purely from a causal relation per-
spective, it may be difficult to justify any more than one month's
credit. Obviously D has not served any time in connection with the
robbery or aggravated assault charge until July 1. The filing of the
robbery charge on that date bore no causal relationship to his continued
confinement pursuant to the burglary charge. Only if he had the
means to post the $2,000 bail set on the burglary charge and was pre-
vented from doing so because of the additional charge could the con-
clusion be that the robbery charge was the cause of his continued
confinement.' 89  After his acquittal of the burglary charge his con-
finement was due solely to the robbery indictment. 190
Denial of all credit except for pretrial custody that was actually
caused by the robbery charge could be justified on the ground that the
time spent before the burglary acquittal was time any innocent crimi-
nal defendant would have had to serve in lieu of bail. A person sim-
ilarly situated who had no additional charges against him would
not get any benefit from the time spent in pretrial custody. Moreover,
189. See Brown v. United States, 311 F. Supp. 325 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
190. See Commonwealth ex rel. Bleecher v. Rundle, 207 Pa. Super. 443, 217 A.2d
772 (1966).
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the allowance of any time accumulated pursuant to the burglary charge
may be attacked as "banking."' 91
Despite these arguments, two states and the ABA Sentencing
Standards would allow credit for all the presentence time included
in the. hypothetical problem. New York and Kentucky have identical
statutes which specify that if the original charge on which the de-
fendant is held is dismissed or results in an acquittal, credit that
would have been due with respect to the original charge must be set
off against "any sentence that is based on a charge for which a warrant
or commitment was lodged during the pendency of such custody.' 1 92
The ABA Sentencing Standards provide:
If the defendant is arrested on one charge and later prosecuted on
another charge growing out of conduct which occurred prior to
his arrest, credit against the maximum term and any minimum
term of any sentence resulting from such prosecution should be
given for all time spent in custody under the former charge which
has not been credited against another sentence. 193
The comments explaing this standard include a statement that the
above wording was preferred over the New York law because the latter
does not seem to extend credit to defendant who is arrested, interro-
gated, released, but then rearrested and convicted on another charge
"even though the whole series of events was aimed at precisely the
conviction that occurred."' 9 4
The concept of fairness embodied in the above statutes and in the
ABA proposal would seem to justify the award for all the time our
hypothetical defendant spent in jail. In North Carolina v. Pearce'95
the Supreme Court lamented the fact that usually the time an ac-
quitted defendant spends in jail cannot be returned to him. How-
ever, this can be accomplished in the situation described above. The
suggested approach avoids the banking argument by limiting the avail-
191. See note 181 & accompanying text supra.
192. See note 131 supra. Contra, People v. Darling, 62 Misc. 2d 207, 308
N.Y.S.2d 228 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
193. ABA SENTENCNG STANDARDS, supra note 2, § 3.6(d). The commentary on
this provision indicates that the basic concern of the committee was the situation in
which a person is arrested on a minor or "holding" charge although he is suspected,
and later charged, with a greater crime. The committee acknowledged also "that in
justice the defendant should be awarded credit for time detained for unprosecuted
charges." Id. at § 3.6(e).
194. Id.; cf. People v. Rosen, 45 Misc. 2d 789, 791, 257 N.Y.S.2d 626, 628 (Sup.
Ct. 1965) (No credit on subsequent sentence for time during which the defendant was
held as a material witness on an unrelated charge. The criminal charge was filed
the day he was released from material witness custody.).
195. 395 U.S. 711, 719 (1969).
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ability of credit to the time spent in custody after the commission of
the offense for which sentence credit is sought."9
6
Credit for Time Spent in Custody in Another Jurisdiction
Closely related to the problem of the necessary connection be-
tween the claimed credit and subsequent sentence is the question whether
one jurisdiction should award credit for time spent in custody in an-
other jurisdiction. 9 7  The legislative history of the federal time credit
statute' 9 indicates that Congress intended that credit be awarded to pris-
oners first arrested on state charges but subsequently turned over to
federal authorities for prosecution. 99 For example, if a person is ar-
rested and charged with robbery by state authoritities in connection
with a hold -up of a federally insured bank, and if the state chooses to
turn the defendant over for federal prosecution rather than prosecute
him under the state charge, section 3568 would allow him credit on his
federal sentence for the time spent in state custody in connection with
the same conduct, that is, for the robbery of the bank.200 Also, if fed-
eral detainers filed against a person held by a state on unrelated charges
prevent the release of the prisoner on bail, the time he spends in state
custody thereafter must be credited to his subsequent federal sen-
tence.20 ' In such a case the cause of the continued confinement is the
federal charge represented by the detainer. However, a prisoner sub-
ject to federal detainer when held by state authorities and who was un-
able to make state bond has been denied credit for the state time on a
later federal sentence growing out of the charge represented by the
detainer.20 2
Another interesting variation is the case of a prisoner serving a
sentence in a state institution and who is delivered to federal authori-
ties for prosecution. The issue is whether the prisoner is entitled to
credit against his federal sentence for the time during which he was
"loaned" to federal authorities. In Siegel v. United States203 the court
196. ABA SENTENCING STANDARDS, supra note 2, at § 3.6(e).
197. The important and complex problem of fixing terms for multiple offenders
subject to several sentences in two or more jurisdictions is beyond the scope of this
article. See generally ABA SENTENCING STANDARDS, supra note 2, § 3.5.
198. 18 U.S.C. § 3568 (1970).
199. H.R. REP. No. 1541, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1966).
200. United States v. Morgan, 425 F.2d 1388 (5th Cir. 1970).
201. Davis v. Attorney General, 425 F.2d 238, 240 (5th Cir. 1970); Brown v.
United States, 311 F. Supp. 325 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
202. United States v. McCroklin, 410 F.2d 1137, 1138 (6th Cir. 1969).
203. 436 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1970). Accord, Jefferson v. United States, 389 F.2d
385 (2d Cir. 1968).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 23
PRESENTENCE CONFINEMENT
rejected a prisoner's request for credit for such time on the ground
that the prisoner was continuing to serve his state sentence while on
loan to the federal authorities, and he was not entitled to double
credit.20 4 Perhaps this opinion should be welcome if it implies a re-
jection of the "dual sovereignty" theory -upholding the power of the
states and federal government to impose separate punishments for
the same act.20 5 A refusal to treat separately the time spent in actual
federal custody, even if within the period of a state sentence, seems
inconsistent with the dual sovereignty rationale.20 0 Moreover, the
prisoner "borrowed" from the state is held temporarily in federal cus-
tody "in connection with the offense or acts" which result in a federal
sentence, and in other situations there is no policy against "double"
credit in the federal/state context. For example, assume that D is
held on charges of burglary in a state that requires credit for presen-
tence jail time and bond is set at $1,000. He is about to make bond,
but a federal detainer is filed in connection with an alleged inter-
state transportation of a stolen motor vehicle. Bond is increased to
$2,000 and defendant is unable to secure his release. He is later con-
victed of both crimes. In this context he could receive credit on his
state sentence for all the time spent pending disposition of the state
charge. Even though there is an overlap, he would receive credit on
the federal sentence for the presentence time served after the filing
of the federal detainer.20 7 Credit is "double" only in that it is applied
to separate sentences imposed by separate sovereigns in situations
where there was "shared" custody.
As a policy matter, consideration should be given to the award of
credit to a person who is serving a sentence in one jurisdiction and is
subject to a detainer based on outstanding charges in another. It is
well known that detainers affect the custodial treatment of a prisoner.
Because of the pending charge he may be regarded as a greater es-
cape risk and be subjected to greater security; because of the -uncer-
tainty of his release date he may be precluded from partaking in re-
habilitational activities including educational and work-release pro-
204. 436 F.2d at 95.
205. See generally Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
206. See Walsh v. State ex rel. Eyman, 104 Ariz. 202, 450 P.2d 392 (1969)
(prisoners serving Arizona sentence entitled to credit on that sentence for time during
which they were returned to California for trial on other charges. Grant of credit
consistent with policy granting speedy trial and encouraging disposition of outstanding
charge in order to remove some of the adverse consequences of detainers).
207. See note 201 supra.
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grams. Also, the detainer may affect adversely his chances of pa-
role.2°8  Recognizing the impact of these factors, the United States
Supreme Court has imposed upon the states the duty to afford speedy
trials to prisoners subject to detainers..2 1°  In light of the important
interest of the accused in a speedy trial, and since detainers have signifi-
cant custodial effects, a prisoner subject to a detainer based on an out-
standing charge should be given credit against any subsequent sen-
tence that is based on that charge from the date of the filing of the de-
tainer to the date of sentence. Such a rule would (1) provide prose-
cuting authorities with a needed incentive to grant speedy trials to pris-
oners held in custody in other jurisdictions; (2) decrease partially the
corrosive effects of detainers; and (3) encourage interstate coopera-
tion in working out rational sentences for multiple offenders.
As to the third point, it is not to be understood that once a pris-
oner serving a sentence is returned to another jurisdiction for trial
the second sentence must always be made to run concurrently with the
first. As far as the above proposal is concerned, only the time between
the filing of the detainer and the sentencing on the charge represented
by the detainer would be awarded as credit as a matter of right. How-
ever, at the time of sentencing the court must attempt to determine a
fair and realistic sentence, taking into account the time already served as
well as the time to be served under existing sentences.
The point is well stated in the ABA Sentencing Standards:
The failure to integrate prison sentences for crimes committed
in different states seriously inhibits a consistent, coherent treat-
ment program during confinement. Similarly, detainers typically
prevent the phasing of the individual back into the community at
the optimal time. It is therefore highly desirable that multiple
sentences of imprisonment imposed by different states be served at
one time and under one correctional authority. It is also desirable
that all outstanding charges of offenses committed in different
states be disposed of promptly. 210
The standards suggest also that interstate consecutive sentencing be al-
lowed only where there is a clear showing of a need to protect the pub-
lic by the imposition of an extended term. Otherwise prison authorities
should give automatic credit "for all time served in an out-of-state insti-
tution since the commission of the offense.
'2 1 1
208. See generally C. NEWMAN, SOURCEBOOK ON PROBATION, PAROLE AND PARDONS
216-22 (1958); S. RuBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 219-26 (1963); Com-
ment, Detainers and the Correctional Process, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 417.
209. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 377-78 (1969).
210. ABA SENTENCING STANDARDS, supra note 2, § 3.5(a).
211. Id. at § 3.5(c). The Michigan Supreme Court has taken a strong stand
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A few recent cases deal with the question of credit for time in cus-
tody while fighting extradition. Michigan, New York and Pennsyl-
vania, all of which have liberal presentence time credit statutes, have al-
lowed credit for the period spent contesting extradition in another state
in connection with the charge that culminates in sentence in the de-
manding state.212 The Tennessee Supreme Court refused to grant
credit for the period during which the prisoner opposed extradition
from Pennsylvania to Tennessee where he was to begin service of a
sentence:
[I]t is really up to the prisoner who has been convicted to bring
himself within the confines of the law to get the credit for the
sentence that he concedes has been rightly fixed against him,
and . . . the prisoner cannot by his acts have his sentence be-
gin running before he presents himself to the officers for incarcer-
ation under the sentence. 213
against consecutive sentencing in the absence of specific statutory authorization.
Browning v. Department of Corrections, 385 Mich. 179, 183, 188 N.W.2d 552, 555
(1971); In re Carey, 372 Mich. 378, 380, 126 N.W.2d 727, 728 (1964). As to sen-
tences passed by different sovereigns which result in the imposition of consecutive
terms, the court observed in Carey: "There seems little justification for this dual
approach in the sentencing law, and the sooner we eliminate it the better. A de-
fendant who is sentenced in a state court after receiving sentence in a federal court
is subject to the same 'undefined and uncertain contingencies' about when state sen-
tence begins, as he is in the case of two or more state sentences. The reason for the
rule aptly applies in both types of cases. Therefore, we hold that where a defendant
has been sentenced in federal court, and is subsequently sentenced in a state court or
courts, sentence may not be imposed to commence at the completion or expiration of
federal sentence in the absence of statutory authority." Id. at 381, 126 N.W.2d at
729. But see United States v. Gaines, 436 F.2d 1069, 1070 (2d Cir. 1971) (no credit
on federal sentence which was held in abeyance due to state charges that were later
dropped. State "dead time" was about equal to the two year federal sentence im-
posed while defendant was awaiting state trial).
212. People v. Havey, 11 Mich. App. 69, 82-83, 160 N.W.2d 629, 636 (1968)
(statute designed to confer a benefit should not be construed to the detriment of a
person it is designed to aid); People v. Nagler, 21 App. Div. 2d 490, 494, 251 N.Y.S.
2d 107, 111 (1964) (Credit for time spent fighting extradition from France. "A.
fugitive from justice detained in another state or territory of the United States by
reason of being charged with the commission of a crime in a sister state is held in
custody under process of law .... And if the subject be detained in a foreign coun-
try by reason of a treaty stipulation he is similarly held in custody under process of
law . . . and by reason of a legal arrest.") But see People v. Luttrell, 60 Misc. 2d
528, 303 N.Y.S.2d 105 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (escapee facing charges of burglary and lar-
ceny in New York arrested in Pennsylvania and charged and convicted there as a
fugitive from justice with reference to the burglary and larceny charge in New York.
Returned to New York after service of five months in Pennsylvania. New York re-
fused credit for Pennsylvania time on ground prisoner was held on separate and
distinct charge in Pennsylvania.).
213. State ex rel. Crist v. Bomar, 211 Tenn. 420, 427, 365 S.W.2d 295, 298
(1963).
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Insofar as this reasoning applies to presentence time spent assert-
ing rights with regard to extradition, it could as well be applied to the
exercise of other rights such as contesting the admissibility of ille-
gally seized evidence, challenging jury selection procedures, venue, etc.
Viewed from this perspective, the Tennessee position is untenable in that
denial of credit for the time exercising these rights would be tantamount
to a penalty for their assertion and, as such, a denial of due process.
Conclusion
With some notable exceptions such as Stapf, Sobell, and Robin-
son v. Beto, the presentence time credit cases show very little in terms
of analytical depth. Perhaps this is because many petitions for credit
are made by prisoners pro se, and arguments supporting the award
of credit are made inartfully. However, the constitutional principles
flowing from Williams, Tate, and Pearce require state and federal
courts to deal seriously with claims for credit without regard to when
sentence was passed. Unless the record reveals that a prisoner has
been accorded full credit for presentence confinement, including good
time and credit toward parole eligibility, prison authorities should
recalculate release dates taking the presentence time into account.
None of the existing statutes seem wholly adequate in light of the
problems discussed above. The model suggested in the ABA Sentenc-
ing Standards comes closest to meeting the constitutional requirements
and the requirements of sound penal policy and should seriously
be considered by Congress and all state legislatures. However, the
award of credit should be an administrative function once a court has
determined the appropriate length of time a particular defendant should
serve without regard to the time spent in custody pending trial and
sentence. This procedure would remove the need for any presumption
as to the award of credit and would preclude the award of double
credit.
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